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Abstract 
In this study, 190 college students received a 
persuasive communication under conditions of high or 
low source credibility and high or low ego involvement, 
in which ~s w~re permitted to overtly respond to the 
communication or not. This study, a replication of an 
earlier pilot study, was based on two approaches to 
attitude cha~ges social judgment and cognitive response 
analysis of persuasion. The major hypotheses, designed 
to test critical evaluative sets, stated that. less 
attitude change will occur (a) in the low rather than 
the high credible source (low credible source set), 
(b) in the high rather than low involvement (high in-
volvement set), (c) in the high rather than low cogni-
tive response (high cognitive response set), and (d) 
for the high involvement, high cognitive response con-
dition, in the high rather than low credible source 
(high credible source as threat set). Results confirmed 
the existence of the high cognitive response set, but 
did not confirm the existence of the remaining three 
sets. Reasons for the failure to confirm these latter 
sets are discussed. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This research is an attempt to demonstrate a previously 
never discussed phenomenon in the area of attitude change. The 
phenomenon, in my opinion, is a fairly common one in social 
situations. If a person is presented with a communication pro-
posing a view opposite to his own, and if the communication is 
attributed to a highly reputable author, and if the person is 
provided the opportunity to offer rebuttal and feels personally 
involved in the debate, then the person may view the author as a 
threat. and he might present a stronger rebuttal as a result of 
these conditions, thereby reinforcing nis previous position. The 
research is modeled after a similar situation in the realm of 
track and field sports. A runner will run to defeat his opponent. 
As his opponent is viewed as a serious threat to the runner's own 
competence, the runner will run faster to defeat him. The same 
situation would be present in a political debate, a discussion 
among colleagues, and perhaps in certain advertising situations. 
This present study seeks to replicate and elaborate upon the 
results of an earlier pilot study {Scileppi, 1971) which explored 
the same phenomenon. 
1 
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More specifically this paper is an attempt to investigate th 
process of attitude change and to determine the effects of three 
variables• source credibility, ego-involvement, and cognitive 
response expression facilitation and their interactions, on atti-
tude change. The research was prepared in order to elaborate upo 
two major approaches to attitude change, the social judgment-per-
ceptual set approach and the cognitive response analysis to per-
suasion. Each of these two orientations will be considered in 
succession, along with the variables relevant to these theories 
and to this research. Finally, the interaction.of the three 
variables will be considered, in view of these two approaches, an 
the merits of a new concept, "the high credible source as threat" 
evaluative set will be discussed. 
The Social Judgment Approach 
The social judgment approach, initiated by Sherif and 
Hovland (1961) is basically concerned with the m&iner in which an 
individual forms a reference scale with which to perceive and to 
judge a persuasive communication. The approach originated in the 
area of psychophysics and has been adopted by these and other 
social psychologists as a new perspective with which to study 
attitude formation and change. Sherif and Hovland's research in-
volved the manner in which the individual perceived the degree of 
discrepancy between his own position on.an issue and the position 
of a persuasive communication. These researchers maintained that 
a person would judge the communication by comparing it with some 
J 
anchor or frame of reference, and then determine whether the posi 
tion advanced by the communication fell into his latitude of ac-
ceptance or into the range of his rejection. If the position o.f 
the communication fell into the former category, the individual 
assimilated the new position into his own, and attitude change 
toward the position of the communication occurred as a direct 
function of the degree of discrepancy. If the communication fell 
into the latter category, the individual rejected the new posi-
tion, and perceived the communication as expressing a viewpoint 
more discrepant from his own position than it actually was. In 
this case, he would contrast his position with that of the com-
munication, and if any attitude change occurred at all, it would 
be in the direction opposite that advocated by the communication, 
i.e., attitude change would be a decreasing function of the degre 
of discrepancy. A third alternative occurred if the communicatio 
fell into neither of these two categories. In this case, the 
individual perceived that the communication lay in his latitude 
of non-commitment and presumably would have no effect on his 
attitude. 
Ego Involvement 
Sherif and his associates (Sherif and Hovland, 19611 Sherif 
and Sherif, 1967; Sherif, Sherif and Nebergal, 1965) found that 
certain variables affected the size of the latitudes of accep-
tance, rejection and non-commitment. One of the more important 
of these variables-· was ego involvement. 
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The definition of the term, attitudinal involvement, has 
been modified and altered often in the past twenty-five years. 
Sherif and Cantril (1947) were the first major authors to apply 
the term ego involvement to the. study of attitudes. These re-
searchers considered ego involvement to refer to any stimulus re-
lated by the person to himself. This definition included those 
attitudes with which the person identifies and makes part of him-
self, and which are incorporated into his self definition and be-
come aspects of his frame of reference. Sherif and Cantril sug-
gested that the degree of ego involvement determined how greatly 
an individual would "cling to" a particular attitude. Much of 
Sherif 's later work on involvement concerned this "cling to" 
aspect of attitudes. 
More recently, other researchers have attempted to divide 
ego involvement more precisely into its various components. A 
typical breakdown was offered independently by Fr~edman (1964) 
and Greenwald (1965). These researchers defined position involve-
ment as interest in, or commitment to a particular position on an 
issue·; that is adherence to a prior position or decision. Solu-
tion involvement, on the other hand, was defined by these authors 
as interest in an issue, without reference to a particular posi-
tion, and the commitment to seeking a good solution to a problem. 
It could be argued that the two types of involvements are not 
. 
basically distinct. Solution involvement could result from a 
positive self concept in which the individual feels motivated to 
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come to a good solution to a problem in order to maintain his 
image of himself as a critical evaluator and intelligent person. 
such a situation could also be called position involvement, if 
one considers that the attitude issue in question is a person's 
self concept, and the position adhered to is a favorable self 
concept. 
Furthermore, .one would expect that the two types of involve-
ment exist together, phenomenologically. Miller (1965) views ego 
involvement as a combination of four factors. In addition to 
position and solution involvement, Miller also lists social sup-
port and frequent rehearsal of arguments supporting one's posi-
tion as indicative of attitudinal ego involvement. High involve-
ment, according to Miller, implies that all factors are present. 
Thus Miller does not see position and solution involvement as 
occurring independently of each other. 
Ostrom and Brock (1968) returned to Sheri~ and Cantril's 
(1947) broad definition of ego involvement as referring to the 
manner in which the individual identifies himself. These re-
searchers have investigated the process relating attitudes and 
personally held values. In their model, Ostrom and Brock pre-
dicted that involvement was dependent on the number of values 
related to the attitude, the degree of relationship between the 
attitude and the value, and the centrality to the self concept of 
the value. Thus, emphasis has moved fr6m isolating the types of 
involvement to considerations of the process by which an attitude 
becomes ego involving, and the results of involvement. 
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In the social judgment approach, as ego involvement in-
creased, Sherif and his associates considered the person's own 
position would become the internal anchor from which the scales 
of reference were based, and that the internal anchor is more in-
fluential than external anchor standards in forming judgments. 
The main effects of ego involvement hypothesized by Sherif and 
Hovland (1961) we:r;-e that involvement would tend to exaggerate 
both the assimilation and contrast effects, distorting the per-
ceived position of the communication, and that the point on the 
continuum of attitude positions in which a shift from assimila-
tion to contrast occurred would move closer to the individual's 
own position. Thus a highly involved person would have a wider 
latitude of rejection and a narrower latitude of acceptance than 
a less involved person. Later empirical results (Sherif & 
Sherif, 1967) led Sherif to conclude that the latitude of accep-
tance does not change but that high ego involvement causes the 
.. 
latitude of rejection to enlarge, making the latitude of non-
commitment smaller. 
The literature on involvement has shown some fairly consis-
tent trends. Freedman (1964), using a concept formation task, 
found that more change in concept occurred under low involvement 
than under high involvement. Involvement according to Freedman, 
concerned the importance to the subject of an aspect of the ex-
perimental task, and the salience of that sub-task in determining 
intelligence level. A number of the other researchers supported 
the hypothesis of the social judgment approaches that low 
~ ---------------------------------:--------------------------------, 7 
involvement will cause more attitude changes than high involve-
ment. Aiello (1967) found persuasibility was negatively corre-
lated to .involvement. Sereno (1968) using a belief-discrepant 
communication, found that although both the high involvement and 
low involvement groups did exhibit attitude change toward the 
communication, the attitude change of the low involvement group 
was significantly greater than that of the high involvement sub-
jects. Rhine and Severance (1970), using an increase-in-tuition 
topic, found more attitude change occurred under low involvement 
than for high involvement. Atkins and Bieri (1968) in an experi-
ment evaluating the effects of the levels of involvement on 
social judgment, found heightened involvement caused greater con-
trast effects, which cause less change, particularly in highly 
discrepant messages. McGinnies (1968) relates two experiments 
conducted in Taiwan and Japan which also support the hypothesis 
that more attitude change occurs under low ego-involvement than 
,. 
under high involvement. 
Edwards and his associates (Edwards, 1970; Edwards & Ostrom, 
1969, using research stemming from Ostrom and Brock's cognitive 
-
bonding model on a person perception topic, found that as the in-
dividual's attitude toward the stimulus person was bonded to more 
central values (i.e., as involvement increased), there was 
greater resistance to attitude change, thus supporting Sherif and 
Hovland's hypothesis. 
One of the few experiments which did not confirm Sherif and 
Hovland's hypothesis was conducted by Miller (1965). In this 
8 
study, Miller manipulated involvement by stressing the importance 
of the issue, and by committing the subjects to distribute liter-
ature in.support of the attitudes among other methods. Miller 
found no difference in the latitudes of acceptance and rejection 
caused by involvement, thus not confirming the involvement hypo-
thesis. The vast body of literature, however, continues to sup-
port the hypothesis. Research conducted by the author (Johnson & 
Scileppi, 1969; Scileppi, 1971) involving both high school and 
college students has demonstrated that subjects in the high in-
volvement condition showed significantly less attitude change 
than subjects in the low involvement condition. 
The problem with much of the research which has been used as 
evidence supporting this thesis is that Sherif and many other re-
searchers have used natural groups with different levels of in-
volvement, and a variety of types of issues, both of which vary 
on many continua other than involvement, thus confounding the 
involvement variable. Johnson and Scileppi (1969) utilized a 
different method to manipulate involvement. These researchers 
varied the stated purpose of the research while retaining the 
communication ·concerning the same topic, with samples of subjects 
taken from the same population. In this study, high involvement 
was achieved by informing high school males that the purpose of 
the research, funded by a national foundation, concerned how well 
they as high school students could make mature, sound and intel-
ligent judgments. Low involvement was produced·by informing 
similar students that t.he -ourpose of the research was to 
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standardize some materials, and that the researchers were not 
interested in their opinions as such. In this way, only involve-
ment is manipulated, and there is a smaller possibility that 
other facto+s are influencing these results. 
In an unpublished study (Scileppi, 1971) used a similar 
method to manipulate ego involvement for college students. In 
this study, the high involvement treatment consisted of stating 
that the purpose of the study was to determine whether college 
students aged eighteen to twenty years were capable of evaluating 
material relevant to political issues as an indication of their 
qualifications to vote in national ~lections. The low involve-
ment treatment was nearly identical to the earlier Johnson and 
Scileppi (1969) study. 
Involvement was considered to be an important variable in 
the present study, both in terms of its relationship to the 
evaluative set theory and also because of the variable's poten-
r 
tial interaction with the other two independent variables in the 
study. Also, high involvement was found to be of crucial impor-
tance in the earlier Scileppi (1971) pilot study in developing 
the situation "in which the subject would feel motivated to com-
pete against the author of the discrepant communication. 
Source Credibility 
Another variable discussed by She~if and Sherif (1967) rele-
vant to the social judgment approach is source credibility. 
Source credibility refers to the degree to which the subject 
- 10 
perceives the source as being knowledgeable on the issue and as 
being motivated to communicate his knowledge. Basically, source 
credibility involves expertise and trustworthiness (McGuire, 
1968). The Sherifs have postulated that as the credibility and 
status of the source increase, the latitude of acceptance will 
increase and the latitude of rejection will decrease. Thus, at-
titude change in the direction of the source •_s position will be 
directly related to the source's credibility. This conclusion is 
by no means unique to the social judgment approach. Most theo-
rists following a cognitive consistency approach or_ a learning-
reinforcement approach have made the. same hypothesis. Research 
has demonstrated this relationship starting from the earliest 
studies (Hovland & Weiss, 19.52). Insko (1967), after reviewing 
all the relevant research, stated that this conclusion has been 
widely accepted, and that all that remains in question are the 
reasons for the relationship. More recently, howeyer, the uni-
versality of this hypothesis has been questioned. A number of re-
searchers have found that source effects attenuate or even dis-
. 
appear completely under certain conditions. Variables affecting 
and limiting source effects fall into two categories, communica-
tion factors and subject factors. Thus far, the first category 
has been noticeably less significant and less extensive than the 
latter. One example of a communication factor attenuating source 
effects is given by Goldberg (1970). He found that when the 
persuasive message was ambiguous, the usual source effects dropped 
out; The'- sttbject, according to Goldberg, has less motivation to 
11 
agree with a high credible source associated with an ambiguous 
communication. 
Recently, a large body of literature has been compiled con-
cerning the effects of subject factors which attenuate source 
effects on attitude change. Most of this literature concerns the 
area of inner directed versus other directed personalities or in 
Sherif and Hovland's terms and theories, individuals who have 
internal or external scales of reference. For example, Ritchie 
and Phares (1969) found that internally controlled subjects were 
less affected by high prestige sources than externally controlled 
subjects. In the same vein, Koslin, Stoops and Loh (1967) found 
that the more stable subjects were also less affected by the 
source than less stable subjects. Concerning other subject 
traits, Johnson, Torcivia and Poprick (1968) found that high 
authoritarian subjects were less affected by source credibility 
difference than low authorit~rian subjects. Johnson and Torcivia 
(1968), in a similar experiment, found that the personality trait 
of nonacquiescence also decreases source credibility effects. 
Furthermore, cognitive states can be induced in subjects which 
will interact with source credibility in affecting attitude 
change. Sigall and Helmreich (1969) and Johnson, Izzett and 
Honig (1970), working from different theoretical approaches, 
found high irrelevant fear induced in subjects caused t~e differ-
ential source effects to disappear. 
~--------------------~~---------------------, 12 
Interaction of Involvement and Credibility ind the Evaluative Set Model 
Ego involvement is another factor which limits source 
credibility effects. Sherif and Sherif in a 1967 evaluation of 
the social judgment approach theorized that source effects will 
. . 
only occur under low ego involvement, since in this condition, . 
the subject does not have an internal standard for evaluating an 
unfamiliar or neutral message which is not involving for him; 
however, under high ego involvement, the subject has less need 
for an external standard or anchor, as his internal anchor serves 
as his point of reference for· making the judgment. This source 
by involvement interaction has been found often in the literature 
of the last four years, by a number of researchers working inde-
pendently. In a direct test of Sherif's hypothesis, Sereno (1968 
found that the high credible source had differential effects unde 
low and high ego involvement. Under low involvement, the high 
source produced significantly more attitude change than under 
high ego involvement. Unfortunately, Sereno failed to include a 
low credible source in his experiment, so his results do not in-
clude all possibilities in this two way interaction. McGinnies 
(1968) reported the results of two 1965 experiments, one conducte 
in· Taiwan and the other in Japan, concerning the· issue of Americ 
involvement in Viet Nam. The Taiwan experiment demonstrated 
source and involvement main effects bu~ no interaction, whereas 
in the Japanese experiment, there was a significant source by 
involvement interaction. In this latter experiment, the high 
13 
credible source produced significantly greater attitude change in 
the low involvement treatment than in any of the other three con-
( ditions. Furthermore, the differential source effects disappeare 
under high involvement. Rhine and Serverance (1970) found the 
same interaction effect. In this study, a significantly greater 
·difference in attitude change due to source credibility under low 
involvement was found. Johnson and Scileppi (1969) also found 
the same effect. These latter researchers elaborated upon the 
basic social judgment theories by explaining these results in 
terms of an evaluation set model. They argued that source credi-
bility creates.an evaluative set with which the subject perceives 
the communication differentially. The high credible source pre-
disposes the subject to accept the message less critically, 
whereas the low credible source influences the subject to perceiv 
the message more critically and to reject the communication more 
readily. In the same study, Johnson and Scileppi suggest that 
~go involvement could be seen as producing a similar evaluative 
set. A subject who was led to perceive the issue as more impor-
tant to himself would become more involved in his position and 
would tend to be more critical in his evaluation of a communica-
tion advocating a position discrepant from his own, than if he 
were less involved in the issue. Thus as a result of either of 
these critical evaluative sets, low source credibility or high 
involvement, an individual's latitude of acceptance will decrease 
with less assimilation. More significantly, an individual's lati 
tude of rejection would increase, with greater contrast effects 
r 14 
resulting. The effects of these two critical evaluative sets pro-
duce similar effects, and if either set is present, attitude 
change decreases. The Johnson and Scileppi (1969) study, as well 
as the McGinnies 1968 Japanese study, found that the source by in-
volvement interaction was' due primarily to the increase in atti-
tude change of the high credible source-low involvement treatment, 
with the other three treatments producing mutually similar and 
smaller amounts of attitude change. This led Scileppi (1971) to 
suggest that these two critical evaluative sets are non-additive. 
Thus an all or nothing threshold effect exists. That is, if 
either of these two critical evaluative sets is present, less 
attitude change results, but the amount of attitude change is not 
further decreased by the presence of both sets. If the high in-
volvement critical evaluative set is present, low source credi-
bility will not decrease attitude change any further. Similarly, 
if the low source credibility critical evaluative .. set is present, 
high involvement will not further decrease attitude change. The 
explanation for this finding is not as yet understood. The 
present study seeks to shed some light on this question by includ-
ing another variable, cognitive response expression facilitation, 
which under certain conditions may produce still a third critical 
evaluative set. More elaboration concerning the variable will be 
given later in the paper, but first it is appropriate to summarize 
the source and involvement variables. 
Concerning the ego involvement variable, the source credibil-
ity variable and the source by involvement interaction,. the 
15 
present study seeks to confirm the following hypotheses. ·Low in-
volvement will result in more attitude change1 than high involve-
ment (Hypothesis One). In those treatments which are conducted 
in a manner similar to the vast majority of attitude change 
studies (i.e., low cognitive response expression facilitation con-
ditions) there will appear a source by involvement interaction. 
Specifically, the effects of source credibility differences will 
occur only under low ego involvement conditions (Hypothesis Two). 
Finally, a main effect due to source will result in an attitude 
more favorable to the high source's position than to the low 
credible source (Hypothesis Three). 
Cognitive Response to Persuasion 
The second major aspect of the present study involves A. G. 
Greenwald's (1968) cognitive response to persuaaion analysis of 
attitude change. By using this method to study the mediational 
cognitive processes involved in attitude change, a greater under-
standing of the processes proposed in the evaluative set theory 
may be gained. Basically, Greenwald reasons that when an 
1In the remainder of this paper, the phrases "attitude 
change" and "attitude favorability to the source's position" will 
be used interchangeably. Attitude change is perhaps a less ac-
curate term, as no attitude pretests were administered to the 
subjects. However, since the topic was fictitious, the subjects 
should not have developed an attitude prior to receiving the in-
formation in the test booklet. Also, the two control groups 
serve as a reasonable indication of the.average subject's atti-
tude change if one assumes that all subjects had attitudes simila 
to the control groups before the experimental manipulation was 
administered. 
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individual is exposed to a persuasive communication, he is moti-
vated to reconcile the message with his existing knowledge, 
values and feelings, which are not actually present in the communi~ 
cation. He therefore rehearses his existing cognitive elements 
relevant to the message, which includes his initial attitude con-
cerning the issue. The reading of a persuasive communication may 
actually recall to the person his own prior attitude, thus de-
feating the purpose of the communication. Thus an opposing com-
munication could strengthen a person's own attitude because he is 
led to rehearse his own position and relearn that position better. 
Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield (1949), and Kelman (1953) include 
the possibility that these cognitive rehearsals could act as in-
terfering responses decreasing the learning or the acceptance of 
the persuasive communication which generated these responses. 
Greenwald named the cognitive rehearsal the "cognitive re-
sponse to persuasion." In his research, he_has used these re-
sponses as independent variables in the study of attitude change. 
Thus, he has studied the relative effects on attitude change of 
both the persuasive communication and the cognitive responses to 
that communication. Greenwald included response or evaluative 
sets as one aspect of these cognitive responses. Response sets 
affect the subject's p~rception of the salience of particular cog-
nitions in evaluating the persuasive communication. Greenwald 
further contends that the mere recall of the content of the per-
suasive communication bears little if any relationship with the 
attitude change, since the content of the message will only serve 
r- 17 r as a stimulus, provoking the rehearsal of the person's previous 
' r 
attitudinal position. Thus a larger percentage of the variance 
involved in such attitude change research will depend on the sub-
ject's initial feelings about the issue and the degree to which he 
is motivated to rehearse his own position while attending to the 
persuasive communication than on the content of the persuasive 
communication itself. Greenwald (1968) cited an unpublished ex-
periment by Love as supporting this conclusion. In Love's study, 
subjects were asked to read one communication advocating either 
that Puerto Rico become the 5lst state or that the Secretary of 
State be elected by the people. Each of the communications was 
divided into three parts, with the main or theme sentence under-
lined in advance for each part. The subjects were asked to react 
to these statements. Later, they were asked to recall their cog-
nitive reactions during the communication. Love tested each of 
these three variables (recall of communicat~on, recall of self 
generated responses, and the content of those respcnses) as pre-
dictors of attitude change. The results indicated that the actual 
content of the cognitive responses, and the recall of these self-
generated responses correlated significantly greater with attitude 
change than the recall of the main points of the message. In mos1 
of Greenwald's work, an assumption is made that the subject is 
continually making cognitive responses to persuasive communica-
tions, and that asking a person to verbalize or write responses 
does not change the degree or intensity of the cognitive responses 
but represents only a change from covert to overt expression 
18 
,(Greenwald, personal communication January 5, 1971). However, 
Scileppi (1971) found that requesting the subjects to write down 
·responses facilitated their expression and increased their inten-
sity. Those subjects involved in writing their cognitive re-
sponses demonstrated significantly less favorable attitudes towar 
the position advocated by the persuasive communication than the 
subjects not asked to express their cognitive responses. 
The present paper views the cognitive response expression 
facilitation as a critical evaluative set, orienting the individ-
ual to rehearse and defend his initial position more than if he 
were asked merely to read the persuasive communication. 1 It is 
hypothesized that cognitive response expression facilitation 
(high cognitive response) will produce less attitude change than 
merely reading the communication (low cognitive response) (Hypo-
thesis Four). It is also predicted that the degree of favorabil-
ity to the source's position of the cognitive response statements 
in the high cognitive response conditions will be highly corre-
lated with attitude change (Hypothesis Five). 
·Scileppi (1971) also found a tendency toward greater recall 
of the persuasive communication for the high cognitive response 
1considering cognitive response as a critical evaluative set 
is not opposed to the counterarguing research (cf. Deaux, 1969, 
Rodgers and Thistlethwaite, 1968). All that is implied by the 
present model is that encouraging the overt expression of one's 
thoughts on the message causes the indiyidual to view the materia 
more critically. Thus, a perceptual set is established. This 
evaluative set will cause more intense counterarguing to take 
place. The set is the predisposing factor, the more intense 
counterarguing represents the process which results. 
groups than for the low cognitive response groups. Thus it would 
appear that by asking a subject to verbalize his responses to the 
communication, he considered the communication more seriously and 
pondered over it more closely. This lends more evidence to the 
view that cognitive response expression facilitation is a critica 
evaluative set model, and that through the request for verbaliza-
tion, the individual structures his cognitive abilities for this 
task to a greater extent than if he were not asked to write his 
responses. Therefore, it is predicted that the amount of recall 
of the persuasive communication will be significantly greater in 
the high cognitive response treatment than for the low cognitive 
response treatment1 (Hypothesis Six). As _a corollary to the 
fourth and sixth hypotheses it is also predicted that there will 
be a significant negative correlation between the amount of recal 
and attitude change (Hypothesis Seven). 2 
1It is interesting to note that in the high cognitive re-
sponse condition, although exposure to the persuasive communica-
tion may be longer, attitude change toward that communication is 
predicted to be less than the low cognitive response group. 
2It should be emphasized at this point that all the above 
predictions concerning cognitive response and recall will occur 
only in situations in which the persuasive communication is dis-
crepant from the subject's initial position on the issue. In 
order to achieve a standard initial opinion, each subject first 
read an objectively worded communication concerning an unfamilia 
fictitious issue, involving a large industrial company moving int 
a small town. The persuasive communication followed, written in 
a personalistic manner. and advocating a position contrary to 
that suggested by the more objectiye communication. As the 
second communication was advocating a position contrary to the 
objective communication, the cognitive responses to the per-
suasive communication were expected to be generally negative. 
I 
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Another result of high cognitive response expression facili-
tation is that it tends. to lower the subject's evaluation of the 
source. T.his finding was noted in the earlier Scileppi {1971) 
study as a nonsignificant trend. It was inferred in that earlier 
work that as the subject develops his own cognitive responses to 
the source's argument, he devalues the author of those arguments. 
Subjects in the high cognitive response condition tend to rate 
the source as being less trustworthy, less intelligent and less 
competent than those subjects in the low cognitive response condi-
tion. Thus, in the present study, it was predicted that high 
cognitive response will result in lower source ratings.than under 
the low cognitive response condition {Hypothesis Eight). 
In summary, high cognitive response expression facilitation 
tends to produce greater recall of the persuasive communication 
but at the same time, it allows the subject to develop his own 
arguments better, and causes him to derogate the author of the 
persuasive communication. Although there is great~r recall, the 
net effect of cognitive rehearsal and overt cognitive responding 
is to decrease attitude favorability toward the position advocated 
by the persuasive communication. 
The cognitive responses serve a threefold role. First, the 
encouragement to respond overtly is an independent variable. Its 
presence or absence is predicted to produce an effect on attitude 
change. Secondly, the cognitive responses serve as mediator 
variables. By inspection of the cognitive responses, the process 
of attitude change, that is, the individual's acceptance or 
/' 
I 
r--------------------------~2~1~--------------------------. 
rejection of the message, can be studied. Finally, the subject's 
rating of their own cognitive responses serves as a dependent 
variable, as they indicate the subject's final position on the 
issue. 
' 
High Credible Source as Threat Evaluative Set 
The present study has been devised in order to show the roles 
of social judgment and cognitive response analysis approaches to 
attitude change. Both theories discuss evaluative sets; the 
social judgment theory explains the effect of set on attitude 
change, whereas the cognitive response approach sheds light on the 
method by which a set operates. It is proposed that, given a con-
dition producing a critical evaluative set, less attitude change 
should result due to the lack of acceptance of the message. This 
lack of acceptance should be mediated through the subject's 
counterarguing against the message, which can be observed in the 
cognitive response ratings. 
The present experiment is an attempt to confirm the existence 
of the source and involvement sets and also to confirm the exist-
ence of another critical evaluative set, as well as to explore the 
interaction of the three sets. In the condition in which the sub-
ject is highly involved in an issue, and therefore experiences a 
critical evaluative set toward a discrepant communication, he will 
counterargue as previously described. If the subject perceives 
that the discrepant message is a strong one due to its attribution 
to a highly credible source, he will perceive the source as more· 
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threatening than the lower source and as a result, he will be 
motivated to defend his position, and he will counterargue more 
strongly and intensely against the message if given a chance to 
respond to the message. This follows analogously from the widely 
held belief that a man attempts to outpace his opponent and that a 
person will be motivated to fight more strongly against a more 
capable opponent rather than a weaker one. Since the message is 
the same in all conditions, increased counterarguing due to this 
set evaluation of the high credible source as threat should result 
in less attitude change than the low credible source, given that e 
critical evaluative set due to high involvement already exists. 
Thus in this condition, a mild source boomerang effect should re-
sult, which again reopens the question of the universality of 
Insko's conclusion that attitude change varies directly with 
source credibility. This effect will be lessened however but 
probably will not disappear, since the low credib~e source also 
produces a critical evaluative set. The Scileppi (1971) experi-
ment, a pilot study of the present experiment, attempted to 
demonstrate the existence of this high source as threat critical 
evaluative set. In that study, the high credible source-high in-
volvement high cognitive response treatment did produce less atti-
tude change toward the.position advocated by the communication 
than did the parallel low credible source treatment. The differ-
ence, however, was not significant. The present study has repli-
cated the earlier study, but with some slight modification in an 
attempt to strengthen the intended manipulation and to demonstrate 
,,. 
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the critical evaluative sets. The source identifications, the in-
volvement manipulation, and the objective message prior to the 
persuasive communication were improved. The present study pre-
dicts that there will be less attitude change and less favorable 
cognitive response ratings in the high rather than the low credi-
ble source treatment under high involvement, high cognitive re-
sponse condition due to the existence of a high credible source as 
threat critical evaluative set (Hypothesis Nine). 
In summary, the present study makes the following predic-
tionsa 
1. Low involvement in one's initial stand will result in 
more attitude change than high involvement. 
2. The effects of source credibility will occur only under 
low involvement. 
3. The high credible source will produce an attitude more 
favorable to the source's position than the low credible 
,. 
source. 
4. High cognitive response will produce less attitude change 
than low cognitive response. 
5. In.the high cognitive response condition, the degree of 
favorability to the source's position of the cognitive 
response statements will be positively correlated with 
attitude change. 
6, The amount of recall of the persuasive communication 
will be significantly greater for the high cognitive 
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response treatment than for the low cognitive response 
treatment. 
7. There will be a significant negative correlation between 
the amount of recall and attitude change. 
8. High cognitive response will result in less favorable 
source ratings than the low cognitive response condition. 
9. There will be less attitude change and less favorable 
cognitive response ratings in the high rather than the 
low credible source treatment under the high cognitive 
response-high involvement condition, and not under other 
conditions. 
Concerning the main dependent variable, attitude change, a 
three-way interaction is predicted in hypothesis nine, such that 
the high credible source will produce less attitude change than 
the low credible source under the high involvement, high cognitive 
response condition, but not under other condition~. 
A two-way source by involvement interaction is predicted in 
hypothesis two such that the usual source credibility effects will 
occur only under low involvement, and not under high involvement. 
Finally, main source effects are predicted in hypothesis 
three, main involvement effects are predicted in hypothesis one, 
and main cognitive response effects are predicted in hypothesis 
four. 
CHAPT~R II 
METHOD 
A hypothetical issue' was chosen to test the experimental hy-
potheses. The issue involved a fictitious situation concerning a 
small, poor town deciding upon whether to allow a company to buil 
a large factory in the town. An information-oriented, objective 
communication was presented to the subjects which emphasized the 
benefits the'factory would bring. to the townspeople. The subjects 
were then given a persuasive communication which emphasized the 
harm that the factory would do to the town. Thus the information 
in the first communication was intended to produce an attitude 
'favorable to the factory's entry into the town, while the persua-
sive communication proposed a view discrepant from the first com-
munication. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 190 male and female college students en-
rolled in introductory psychology classes at Loyola University of 
Chicago. Over 95% of the subjects were between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty years old. They received one· hour's experi-
1 mental credit for participation in this experiment. The subjects 
were not told the actual purpose of the.experiment, and were 
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tested in small groups varying in size from two to fifteen 
people. The subjects were randomly assigned to experimental con-
ditions with nineteen per cell. 
Desim 
~ 
A 2 x 2 x 2 design, with two levels of each of three vari-
ables (source credibility, ego involvement, and cognitive re-
sponse) with two control groups was used in this experiment. All 
subjects in the eight experimental groups received a persuasive 
communication. This communication was attributed to a high or 
low credible source, and was given under either high or low ego 
involvement conditions. The subjects were either requested to 
write cognitive responses to the arguments presented in the com-
munication or not, The design also included two control groups 
who received either one communication ~oncerning an objective ac-
count of the situation in the town or two communications, the ob-
jective account and the persuasive communication.·· There were six 
categories of dependent variables• measures of attitude change, 
emotional involvement, cognitive response ratings, source evalua-
tions, recall and time. 
Independent Variables 
Ego involvement conditions.--On the second page of the test 
booklet, the subjects read a statement that was purported to be 
the purpose of the study. For the low ego involvement condition 
it was stated that the purpose was to standardize some of the 
materials in the test booklet for later research, and that the 
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experimenters were not interested in the subjects' opinions. The 
actual statement was as follows&· 
The purpose of this study is to standardize some of the 
study for use in later research. We are not particularly 
interested in your attitudes or opinions, but only to see if 
the materials can be used in later studies. 
For the high involvement condition, the subjects were in-
formed that the purpose of the study was to determine possible 
criteria for voting in national elections, and to see whether 
eighteen to twenty year olds are able to critically evaluate 
material and make sound and intelligent judgments concerning what 
they have read. The subjects in this condition were also told 
that the study was sponsored by a joint congressional committee 
studying the quality of voting. The high involvement manipulatio 
was as follows• 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether there 
are ways of differentiating good voters from bad voters in 
state and Federal elections. This particular study grew out 
of a recent controversy in Congress concerning possible dif-
ferences in the manner of thinking between 18 to 20 year 
olds, and those 21 and over. This research, sponsored by th joint congressional committee on voter regulations and by 
several state legislatures, is being undertaken in selected 
colleges and universities throughout the country to study th 
problem, and to make recommendations concerning the estab-
lishment of meaningful criteria to evaluate the quality of 
voter judgment and behavior, to be used in the 1972 Presiden 
tial election. Specifically, this study is concerned with 
two questions• Are there meaningful differences in ability 
to weigh information between those individuals 18 to 20 year 
old and those 21 and over? Can college students critically 
evaluate material relevant to political issues, and make 
sound intelligent judgments concerning what they have read • 
. 
Cognitive response conditions.--On the second page, the sub-
jects read the directions which contained this manipulation. The 
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iow cognitive response expression condition group were instructed 
merely to read the arguments on the next page carefully. 
The high facilitation cognitive response expression groups 
were instructed to read each argument carefully, and to express 
their thoughts, feelings and opinions on each argument immediatel 
after reading them, on a lined sheet of paper which was provided. 
The actual directions were as followsa 
On the next page you will find a blank sheet of paper. 
Detach this sheet and place it on the side of your desk. On 
the following page, you will find a list of arguments in-
cluded in the letter by one of the town's residents, Please 
read each statement carefully, and immediately after reading 
each statement, write a response to that statement on the 
blank sheet on the space provided. Include all your thought 
and feelings on the statement. Write as much as you want, 
but express only one idea in each sentence you write. 
Source credibility condition.--Also on the second page 
booklet, the subjects were given short descriptions of the high 
or low credible source. The high credible source was described a 
an intelligent, respected, very active and publicly-minded life-
long resident of the town, while the low credible source was de-
scribed as an ordinary middle-aged man who moved to the town less 
than six months ago and had not yet made many friendships in town. 
The high ere di ble source .. was described in the test booklet as 
follows• 
The following letter was written by one of the leading 
citizens of the town, a very respected and intelligent perso 
who has performed a number of· publ~c services in the town 
throughout his lifetime. He has been an influential member 
of many of the town's civic organizations, and the general 
feeling in the town is that he is a trustworthy and an 
honorable man. This prominent resident has spoken out on th 
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major issues affecting the town's future on many occasions 
in the past. 
The low credible source was described as follows• 
The following letter was written by a middle-aged man, 
one of the few people to move into the town recently (within 
the last six months, according to his letter}. This man 
left his former residence in another state after he had run 
unsuccessfully for a' small public office. He stated that he 
had few supporters there, as others did not understand him · 
and apparently did not place much trust and confidence in 
him. Although having made few friends in his present town a 
yet, he claims to understand the feelings of the town. 
Both source biographies ended with the statement that the author 
"was definitely against the company moving into the town, due to 
the reasons mentioned (and printed below}." 
Dependent Variables 
The five main groups of dependent measures used in this stud 
included attitude scales, measures of emotional involvement, cog- I 
nitive resp9nse ratings, source evaluation scales, and measures o 
recall. The particular measures used are described in further 
,.· 
detail later on in this paper. 
Attitude.--There were four Likert attitude scales which were 
combined to yield a total attitude measure. These attitude scale 
concerned the subject's attitude toward the company moving into 
the town. 
Emotional involvement.--There were four measures of emotiona 
involvement. The first three were similar in nature and were 
combined to form a general emotional involvement measure. These 
included ratings of intensity of feeling, importance of the issue 
and involvement in the issue. The fourth measure of emotional in-
volvement concerned the subject's perception of the amount of 
effort he made in the experiment. 
Cognitive responses.--The cognitive response ratings involve 
the subject judging the degree to which his ten cognitive re-
sponses were favorable to the persuasive communication. The sub-
ject was instructed to rate each response on a five point scale. 
Source evaluation.--There were seven source evaluation 
ratings covering the subject's perception of the source's trust-
worthiness, intelligence, competence, social activity, "threaten-
ingness," intent to persuade, and the source's position on the 
issue. The first three measures, trustworthiness, intelligence 
and competence, were measures of source credibility as defined by 
McGuire (1968), and were therefore combined into one measure. 
Recall.--Recall was measured by instructing the subject to 
write down as many arguments included in the persuasive communica-
tion as he could. In addition, four fill-in-the-blank type ques-
tions were included, which involved material present in the first 
objective communication. 
A measure of the time taken to complete the cognitive re-
sponses was also included in the study, although this measure 
was not, strictly speaking, a dependent variable relevant to 
the experimental hypothesis, but was included for future 
research. 
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.frocedure 
The test booklets were "shuffled" to insure random assignmen 
of the subjects to treatments, and placed face down on students 
desks in an average sized classroom. One desk was left empty be-
tween every two desks with booklets, in order to discourage any 
student interaction. The students were then admitted to the room 
and were permitted to take any unoccupied desk with a test bookle 
on it. They were instructed not to turn over the booklet until 
they were told to do so by the experimenter. When all the sub-
jects were seated, the experimenter explained to the subjects tha 
they would be asked to read the material in the booklets and to 
answer all the questions present in the booklet. Since both the 
high and low cognitive response conditions as well as the control 
groups were present in the same room, subjects were informed that 
. 
there were several forms of the experiment going on at the same 
time, and that some students would be asked to do different 
,-
things. Subjects were informed that if they completed their own 
form of the test earlier than others, they should remain seated 
and 4uiet in order to allow other students to finish their forms. 
Also, in order.to obtain a time factor for the high cognitive re-
sponse condition, a black check mark was placed on the eighth pag 
of the booklet for the~e groups. The subjects were told to raise 
their hands when and if they came across the check mark, and the 
experimenter would give these subjects further instructions at 
that time. This allowed the researchers to note the time require 
for the subjects to give their cognitive response to the 
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persuasive communication, and as the cognitive response sheets 
were collected at this time, the-subjects could not use this shee 
for responding to the recall questions asked later. All subjects 
were told that they were to read each page in the booklet in suc-
cession, and that once a page was completed, they were not to tu 
back to that page, but always to move forward. The experimenter 
told the subjects to turn the booklets over and begin, and he 
then took a desk in the back of the classroom and observed the 
subjects. When the experimenter observed that all subjects had 
completed the booklet, he collected the forms, and he thanked 
them all for participating in the experiment and proceeded to ex-
plain the true purpose of the experiment and the particular vari-
ables that were operating in the study. The actual hypotheses 
were not stated. The subjects were allowed to ask questions and 
to discuss the experiment with the researcher. The subjects were 
then informed of the reasons why all information concerning the 
;' 
study should no~ be revealed to other students, and the subjects 
were urged t~ keep this information in confidence until May, 1971 
No student admitted to having heard about the study before, al-
though they had opportunity to do so without fear of penalty. 
Materials 
The materials consisted of a test booklet. A complete copy 
of the test booklet appears in the Appendix. On the cover sheet 
of the test booklet appeared a 250 word, objective, two-sided 
account of a situation involving a small, poor town with a 
33 
decreasing population which had been approached by a large ·company 
which wished to build a factory and a research center in the town. 
This account was given so as to give all the subjects a similar 
initial attitude on the topic, generally in favor of the company 
entering the town. 
The second page consisted of experimental manipulations, as 
described above. There were eight variations of this paper ful-
filling the 2 x 2 x 2 design. 
The third page consisted of the communicator's listing of 
ten arguments advocating that the company should not be permitted 
to move into the town. These arguments were advocating a positioru 
discrepant with the communication presented on the cover sheet. 
These arguments covered such areas as pollution, crime, the 
town's style of life and its future, traffic, outsiders moving in, 
conservation of wildlife and natural resources. These arguments, 
the persuasive communication, were the same.for all eight experi-
mental treatments. One of the two control groups received this 
communication in their test booklet. 
The high cognitive response condition had a lined page fol-
lowing the third page upon which the subject's cognitive re-
sponses were to be written. 
The following pages consisted of scales and ·questions com-
prising dependent measures. The first of these pages included 
four statements with instructions stating that the subject should 
indicate his own personal opinion concerning the statement's trutl 
.on a 15 point Likert scale. The first two questions concerned thE 
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subject's attitude towards the company moving into the town, the 
other two questions centered on the subject's intensity and in-
volvement concerning the issue. The first attitude scale stated 
"I fully encourage the town council to grant the company its re-
quest to move into the town." This statement was intended to give 
a direct measure of the subject's personal attitude on the specif-
ic issue. This scale was used in an earlier study (Scileppi, 
1971) and was found to correlate highly with the total attitude 
and with other attitude scales. The second attitude measure 
stated uThe problems the company will cause in the town are very 
great." This scale was a less direct measure of attitudes, and, 
although positively correlated to the first measure, 1 in the 
earlier study, it tapped a slightly different source of variance. 
In this case, the subject had to give a more cognitive.opinion, 
with less affective significance, whereas the first statement was 
more affective and behavioral, The second statement did not force 
the subject to take a position on the general issue; whereas the 
first did require the subject to make a stand. 
The third scale concerned the degree to which the subject 
perceived his feelings on the issue to be intense. The scale 
stated uMy feelings on the issue are very intense." This scale 
was intended to shed light on the processes involved in 
1The direction of the second scale.was opposite that of the 
other three scales in order to serve as a check on response bias. 
In the computations, the scores of the second measure were in-
verted so as to conform to the remaining attitude scales. All 
correlations involving this measure refer to the inverted scores. 
~attitude change. 35 It was hypothesized that the manipulations such 
.. 
t as high involvement, would produce the critical evaluative sets in 
i:• 
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the subjects, and that 'the presence of these evaluative sets would 
heighten the intensity of the subject's feelings. In the absence 
of physiological measures, it was hoped that a scale concerning 
intensity of feeling would tap such a process. In an earlier 
pilot study, higher ratings of intensity were recorded in treat-
ments which involved critical evaluative sets, particularly in the 
treatment involving the high credible source as threat evaluative 
set. 
The fourth sentence on this page stated "I feel my position 
on this issue is very important to me." This statement was ad-
dressed to the same source of variance as the third scale, and was 
included as an additional measure which should correlate with the 
statement on intensity of feeling. This scale had not been used 
previously. 
On the next page, for the high cognitive response groups 
only, instructions were given to the subjects to rate their cogni-
tive response in terms of the degree to which each response was 
favorable to the position advocated by the persuasive communica-
tion on a +2 to -2 scale. This method of self rating, according 
to Greenwald (1968), has been highly reliable and· consistent with 
other judge's ratings, and is a very feasible method of rating 
subjective cognitive responses. In the.pilot study, a slightly 
altered form of the self rating scale was found to be highly 
correlated to attitude scores, an indication of its validity. 
,~,. 
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subjects were requested to place their rating index number to 
left of each cognitive response. 
The next page for all subjects included three more statement 
which the subjects were requested to express their personal 
opinion. The first scale concerned "What do you think of the com 
pany moving into the town?" This statement, on a 15 point favor-
able-unfavorable scale, was considered a more affective measure o 
the subject's attitude on the entire issue. As an evaluative 
measure, it was meant to tap a similar source of variation as the 
first attitude scale. This statement was introduced in the 
present study, and was expected to correlate highly with the firs 
attitude scale. 
The second statement on the same page concerned the subject' 
degree of involvement in the issue. This scale measured a dimen-
sion similar to the intensity and importance scales, and was used 
as a third measure tapping the same source of variance in order t 
observe the factor from a number of perspectives, and measure the 
factor more reliably. This dependent variable, the degree of in-
volvement, was chosen for a second reason, namely, to aid in de-
termining the validity of the involvement manipulation. 
The last question on this page asked "If you were a resident 
of the town, how would.you view the company's request to enter th 
town?" The subjects were asked to respond on a 15 point scale 
where 1 referred to "having all bad points" and 15, "having all 
good points." This attitude scale required the subject to take 
the perspective of a resident of the town to make an evaluative 
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judgment as a person whose future would be affected by the outcome 
of the issue. Thus this attitude scale, while tapping the same 
general attitude dimensions as the other attitude scales, also in-
cluded a unique aspect, involving the assumption by the subject of 
the role of an interested person actually concerned with the 
issue. 
The next page consisted of two categories of questions. The 
first category, consisting of four questions, centered on the sub-
ject's ability to recall the main theme of the objective introduc-
tory communication, and of the involvement manipulation. These 
questions concerned the economic status of the town, the amount of 
population decrease in the preceding two years, the method by 
which the town council chose to resolve the issue, and the stated 
purpose of the experiment. The first three were considered useful 
in determining whether a subject read the cover sheet, and had an 
understanding of the material relevant to the study. Correct re-
sponses would insure that the subjects grasped the town's plight, 
and understood the reason why the town resident wrote the persua-
sive communication. The fourth question centered on the subject's 
understanding and recall of the involvement manipulation. A cor~ 
rect response, differentiating high from low involvement, indi-
cated that the subjects at least were capable of forming the high 
involvement critical evaluative set in the appropriate condition. 
These four questions, with minor variations, were used in the 
pilot study. Over 90% of the subjects in that study responded 
appropriately to all four, questions .• 
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The second category of questions consisted of seven 9 point 
bipolar scales concerned with the subject's perception of source 
attributes. Three of these scales measured more traditional 
attributes such as trustworthiness, intelligence and compe-
tence. The other four dealt with the subject's evaluation of the 
source's position in this issue, his intent to persuade, the de-
gree to which the source was active in the town, and the degree to 
which the source appeared to be threatening. These scales served 
a number of purposes. First, they were manipulation checks on th 
source variable. Second, they indicated possible source deroga-
tion due to the effects of the other two independent variables. 
Certain individual scales were included in order to test specific 
characteristics. It was hoped, for example, that the existence o 
a "high credible source as threat" evaluative set could be demon-
strated by the bipolar scale concerning the attribution of 
"threateningness" to the source by the subject~ The scale con-
cerning the source's position on the issue was devised as a means 
of determining the degree to which assimilation or contrast effect 
were present in the subjects. 
On the next page, the subjects were instructed to recall as 
many of the arguments written by the town's residents as they 
could. The page consi~ted of these instructions and fifteen blan~ 
lines which was considered sufficient space to write the full ten 
arguments. This task indicated the amount of recall of the per-
suasive communication. 
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f. The final page of the experimental booklet was designed to 
r f .. provide further data on the student's interest and involveme~t 
ievel and also to complete the experiment. The subjects were 
asked to indicate how "hard" they tried on a 15 point scale. This 
scale was intentionally located after the subjects believed the . 
. experiment was completed and was worded ·so as to incorporate the 
· subject's feelings throughout the experiment, rather than how they 
. felt about the particular position or issue. It was considered 
·that this scale would give an indirect measure of their interest 
·and involvement, and that the measure should correlate with the 
.three similar measures previously described (involvement, inten-
sity, importance).1 
1Thes-e four meas-u.r.es, and the ·scales measuring the attri bu-
tion to the source.of the quality of threatening, were included in 
order to delve into the process of attitude change~ These meas-
lll'es were intended to give an indication of the ·success of the ex-
perimental manipulations, and to show more directly the process 
r.elating the dependent measures to the independent variables. 
fhis was judged to be a better method than merely using the exist-
ence of the attitude change to confirm the existence of some hypo-
thetical construct or intervening variable. The present practice 
is necessary according to Singer {1966) in assessing the motiva-
tional outcome of the independent variables. Alternative inter-
vening variables, representing different processes of attitude 
change may be present, and may happen to have the same effe_cts for 
the conditions tested as the hypothesized process. What is needed 
according to Singer, is some direct checks on the process. Thus 
in order for the hypothesized critical evaluative sets of the 
present study to be confirmed, more than attitude change is re-
quired. The materials involved in this study attempted to include 
direct measures of the evaluative sets. It should also be under-
stood, however, that it is impossible to devise any checks on the I 
ralidity of the measures used, apart from face validity. Thus al-
though some of these scales were used previously in the earlier 
Pilot study, and found to be somewhat successful, negative or non-
~onfirmatory results of these measures do not necessarily indicate 
the. non-existence of the hypothesized process, but the inadequacy 
)f the measures to tap or reflect that process • 
.,, 
F-~--------------------~4-0-----------------------. 
The other aspects of this final page included a promise of 
silence, and a question devised to allow the student to explain 
any previous information about the experiment. Also, the subjects 
were asked if they felt they were mistreated in any way by the 
experimenter or as a result of particular aspects of the experi-
menter or as a result of particular aspects of the experiment. 
The subjects then gave their name, age and year in college for 
reference purposes. 
r---------------------------------------------. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, the results of the experiment are discusse.d 
in the following sequence. First, the methods used in analyzing 
the data will be discussed briefly. Then the dependent measures 
in relation to the experimental hypotheses will be elaborated 
upon. The results of the manipulation checks will be mentioned, 
and finally, other resultss that is significant intercorrelations 
among the dependent measures, and significant interactions found 
in the dependent measures which were not predicted in the experi-
mental hypotheses. will be discussed and elaborated upon. 
Analysis 
To test the various hypotheses of the study, the following 
statistics were utilized• (a) the analysis of the variance F 
ratio was used for each of the eighteen dependent variables (four 
attitude scales, four involvement measures, seven source evalua-
tions and, for the high cognitive response groups only, one 
measure of time and one cognitive response rating). The eight 
experimental treatments (or in the case of the cognitive response 
and time measures, the four experimental treatments) were compare 
for each dependent measure, and main effects, two way and three 
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waY interactions among the three independent variables were 
examined in terms of the experimental hypothesis. (b) Since the 
design also included two control groups, the Dunnett test (Edwards, 
1968) was used to compare the control groups with each of the ex-
perimental groups for each of the eighteen dependent measures. 
(c) The Duncan New Multiple Range test (Edwards, 1968) was used 
to determine the significance of the difference of the means among 
the eight experimental treatments for each dependent measure. 
(d) The Pearson product moment correlation was also used to com-
pare dependent variables me~suring similar factors and for deter-
mining various intercorrelations. Due to the large number of 
correlations obtained and the possibility of probability loading, 
it was considered necessary to determine levels of significance 
from tables which took the number of the variables into account. 
Such tables are found in Guilford (1965, pp. 580-81). Finally 
the .05 level of significance was chosen as the standard by which 
to accept or reject the null hypothesis of this study. However, 
those comparisons of dependent variables or treatments which 
reached the .10 level were reported as tendencies and for informa-
tional purposes. 
Attitude Change 
Hypotheses One, Two, Three, Four, and Nine are primarily con-
cerned with the main dependent variable, attitude change. The --- --~ 
measures making up this variable will be discussed, and then the 
relationship between these measures and the relevant hypotheses. 
l~ 
~· 
~' ~: 
~· 
,,.· 
\ 
~ 
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The four attitude measures were intercorrelated. The Pearson 
' Product Moment Correlation Coefficients for the four attitude 
: scales appear in Table l. Each intercorrelation reached the .05 
TABLE l 
INTERCORRELATIONS AlVlONG THE FOUR ATTITUDE SCALES 
AND THE COMBINED TOTAL ATTITUDE MEASUREa 
A:ttitude Measures 
l 2b 3 4 Total 
1 .26 .62 .55 .80 
2 .44 .33 .68 
3 .60 .86 
4 
.75 
an = 152 
p < .01, 1:. = .27 (from Guilford (1965). for 150 u. four 
variables) 
bThe values of the second attitude measure are reversed to 
conform to the direction of the other three measures. 
level of significance, and all but one correlation, that between 
the first and second attitude scale reached the .Ol level. This 
implies that there was a significant degree of overlap among the 
four measures. The range of correlation coefficients varied from 
.26 for the first and second attitudes to .61 for the first and 
third scales. Due to these high positiye and significant inter-
correlations, the four attitude scales were combined into a total 
attitude score by summing across the four scales. 
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The 2X2X2 analyses of variance were computed for the total 
and for the four separate attitude scales, and the results are 
given in Table 2. 
The first hypothesis predicted that low involvement would re-
sult in more attitude change than high involvement. As can be 
seen in Table 2, the F ratios for the separate attitude measures 
and for the total.attitude combined measure were below or near 
unity. This indicates that none of the relevant differences were 
significant, and that the hypothesis was not confirmed. There 
was no significant main effect due to involvement. 
The mean attitude change of the treatments of the four sepa-
rate attitude scales and of the combined measure (shown in Table 
J) however, demonstrate that under low cognitive response, the 
high involvement treatments were generally lower than the parallel 
treatments under low involvement. The same trend did not occur 
under the high cognitive response condition, sugg~sting a poten-
tial involvement by cognitive response interaction. Table 2 shows 
that this interaction approached significance in the first, third, 
and fourth measures. Thus, hypothesis one was not confirmed by 
the present study. High cognitive responding caused the usual 
involvement effect to disappear. 
Hypothesis two predicted that source credibility effects 
would appear only under low involvement. Thus a source by in-
volvement interaction was expected. The F ratio for this inter-
action was less than unity for all attitude measures. There was 
a slight tendency for the differences between parallel treatment 
I 
I 
TABLE 2 
2X2X2 ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE ATTITUDE MEASURES 
Attitude 
Source of #1 
Variation H MS 
Involvement (A) l 4.8 
Cognitive (B) 
Response l 75.3 
Source (C) 
Credibility l 1.9 
AX B l 24.5 
AX C l. .6 
BX C 1 44.1 
AX BX C l 4.1 
Within · 144 9.9 
al2 < • 01. sii = 1/144 
bl2 ~ • 05 t 511: = 1/144 
cl2 < .10, ,d!. = 1/144 
Notes a 
F 
8.Ja 
2.7c 
4.5b 
Attitude Attitude 
#2 #3 
MS F MS F 
10.0 1.1 6.7 
5.9 55.7 7.Ja 
7.6 J.7 
.2 19.2 2o5 
.2 .6 
23.7 2.6 .9 
J.7 .9 
9.2 7.6 
Only i•s greater than unity have been reported. 
N = 152, with 19 Ss per cell. 
Attitude 
#4 
MS F 
.6 
18.5 4.4b 
.2 
19.9 4.7b 
.6 
7.1 1.6 
l.l 
4.2 
Total Attit. 
MS F 
81.l 1.2 
11.1 
174.8 2.6 
.8 
210.5 J.lc 
5.5 
68.4 
, 
~ ~t ' 
~·', 
' S',. 
t .. 
1··-~ 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF lVlEANS a ATTITUDE SCALES 
Attitude Measures 
Treatments 1 2 3 4 Combined 
High Cognitive Response 
Hi Inv Hi Cr So, 4.53 6.47 4.oo 6.42 21.42 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So. 4;05 5.89 3.32 5.79 19.05 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So. 4.42 7.84 3.42 5.58 21.26 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So. 3.26 6.01 J.32 5.21 17.84 
Low Cognitive Response 
Hi Inv Hi Cr So. 4.42 6.53 4.26 5.79 21.00 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So. 5,37 6.79 4.05 6.37 22.58 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So. 5.26 6.95 5.42 6.74 24.37 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So. 6.84 7.53 5.16 6.89 26.42 
Control Groups 
One Message 3.32 6,38· J.89 5,17 18.56 
Two Messages 5.94 9.04 5.50 7.00 27.52 
.-
Notes 
The higher the mean, the greater the attitude favorability 
to the source's position. 
means of the combined measure to increase under low involvement 
relative to high involvement. This tendency was not significant. 
A graphic illustration of the treatment mean attitude ch/1ge of 
the total attitude measure showing the extent of this tendency 
appears in Figure 1. The present study therefore failed to con-
firm the second hypothesis. 
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The third hypothesis predicted that the high credible source 
will result in an attitude more favorable to the source's position 
than the low credible source. Thus a main effect was predicted. 
In Table 2, the F ratio for this effect was less than one for all 
attitude measures, and th~refore non-significant. The treatment 
means in Table J show that the high credible source produced more 
attitude change than the low credible source for parallel treat-
ments in the high cognitive response condition, but not for the 
low cognitive response condition. In the low cognitive response 
condition, the low source tended to produce more attitude change 
than the high credible source for parallel treatments. This un-
usual set of findings will be discussed in the next chapter. At 
any rate, since there was no main source effect, hypothesis three 
was not confirmed in the present study. 
Hypothesis four predicted that less attitude change would 
occur in the high cognitive response condition rather than the lo~ 
,. 
cognitive response condition. A main effect due to the cognitive 
response expression facilitation was expected. A significant main 
effect due to the cognitive response was found for the total atti-
tude measure (F = 7. 60, .df. = 1/144; l! < . 01). Significant main 
effects for this variable were also found for the first, third anc 
fourth attitude measures. By inspection of the means (Table J) 
the high cognitive response groups had less favorable attitudes 
(to the source's position) than the meahs of low cognitive re-
sponse groups for parallel treatments. The Duncan New Multiple 
.Range.Test (DNMRT) demonstrated that one set of parallel means 
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accounted for much of the significance of the differences. This 
test indicated that the low credible source, low involvement, low 
cognitive response treatment had significantly greater attitude 
change (p < ,01) than did the low credible source, low involvemen1 
high cognitive response grpup, As can be seen in Figure 1, the 
differences between nearly every other set of parallel means for · 
the total attitude measure were in the predicted direction1 how-
ever. none was significant. Thus, hypothesis four was confirmed 
in the present study. High cognitive response did produce signif-
icantly less attitude change than low cognitive response. 
The next hypothesis dealing specifically with attitude change 
was hypothesis nine. It was predicted that less attitude change 
would occur in the high rather than the low credible source treat-
ment under the high involvement, high cognitive response conditio~I, 
and not under any other condition. It was expected that a three 
way interaction would occur if this hypothesis had been confirmed. 
From the analysis of variance results of Table 2, ·this interactio~ 
was not significant, Also, by inspection of the means in Table J, 
the mean attitude change for the high credible source in the 
critical condition was actually larger in magnitude than the atti-
tude change for the low credible source in the same condition. 
This finding was in a direction contrary to the prediction of hy-
pothesis nine. The tendency existed however for all the attitude 
measures. Thus hypothesis nine was not.confirmed by the present 
study. This finding is significant since the confirmation of this 
hypothesis would have demonstrated the existence of the high 
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credible source as threat critical evaluative set. A more com-
plete discussion of this finding.will be given in the next chapte • 
gognitive Response Favorability Ratings 
The cognitive response dependent variable was included in th 
predictions of hypothesis nine, and the relationship between the 
cognitive response measure and attitude change was relevant to 
hypothesis five. 'Hypothesis nine predicted that the high credibl 
source high involvement treatment would result in less favorable 
cognitive responses than the low credible source, high involvemen 
treatment. Since the cognitive response ratings involved only th 
high cognitive response condition, a 2X2 analysis of variance was 
performed on the data. The results of this analysis appear in 
Table 4. A source by involvement interaction was predicted in 
hypothesis nine. This interaction was significant (F = 4.87, 
gr= 1/72, p <·05). By inspection of the means found in Table 5, 
and by inspection of the graph of the cognitive response ratings 
found in Figure 2, the direction of the interaction was contrary 
to the prediction. A DNMRT was performed on the cognitive re-
sponse favorability ratings. The difference between the means of 
the high and low credible source under high involvement was not 
significant, but the difference between the means of the two 
source treatments under low involvement was significant at the .o 
level. That is the low credible source, low involvement treatmen 
produced significantly more favorable cognitive response ratings 
than the high credible source, low involvement group. This also 
' ,. 
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TABLE 4 
2X2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE COGNITIVE 
RESPONSE RATINGS, AND THE TIME MEASURE 
Cognitive Response 
df MS F MS 
Involvement {A) 1 18.0 62.6 
Source {B) 1 11.1 42.8 
AX B· l 156.3 4.8?a 12.6 
Within 72 32.1 27.6 
al2 < .05, df. = 1/72 
,. 
Notes• 
Only F's greater 
n = 76 
than unity have been reported. 
Time 
F 
2.27 
1.54 
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TABLE 5 
SUMMARY OF MEANS 1 COGNITIVE RESPONSE 
RATINGS, TIMEa AND RECALL 
Treatment 
High Cognitive Response 
Hi Inv Hi Cr So. 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So. 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So. 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So. 
Low Cognitive Response 
Hi Inv Hi Cr 
Hi Inv Lo Cr 
Lo Inv Hi Cr 
Lo Inv Lo Cr 
Control Group 
Two Message 
So. 
So. 
So. 
So. 
b Cogn. Resp. 
14.21 
12.11 
10.37 
14.oo 
Time 
24.63 
25.32 
22.00 
24.32 
aCognitive response and Time measures given to High 
Cognitive response groups only. 
bHigh score indicates agreement with the persuasive 
communication. 
Recall 
7.89 
8.oo 
8.)2 
8.32 
7.05 
6.63 
6.Jl 
6.11 
s.44 
1 .5 
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was unexpected. Thus the predictions concerning the cognitive 
response favorability ratings of hypothesis nine were not con-
firmed. 
Hypothesis five predicted that the cognitive response favora-
bility ratings would be positively correlated to attitude change. 
The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients between the 
attitude measures and the cognitive response favorability ratings 
were calculated. The coefficients ranged from .25 for the second 
attitude measure and cognitive response to .47 for the third atti-
tude scale. The ~between the total attitude measure and the cog-
nitive response ratings was .44. The average ~. for the relation-
ship between the attitude scales and the cognitive response favor-
ability ratings, was ,37. Using a conservative test for signifi-
cance of the ~accounting for the probability loading caused by 
multiple intercorrelations, the average correlation with seventy-
six subjects in the high cognitive response condition and five 
measures involved, was significant beyond the .05 level. Thus the 
relationship between cognitive response favorability ratings and 
attitude change was significant. Hypothesis five was confirmed i 
the present study. 
Source Ratings 
Hypothesis eight was concerned with the dependent measure of 
source evaluations. The seven source evaluation measures were 
intercorrelated to determine whether they were measuring the same 
factor or not. As expected, three measures, trustworthiness, 
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intelligence, and competence, were most highly correlated. These 
~ correlations are given in Table 6. These three measures are 
Trust 
Intell. 
Compet. 
Active 
Threat 
Persuas. 
Position 
Notes a 
Trust. 
TABLE 6 
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE 
SEVEN SOURCE EVALUATIONS 
In tell. Compet. Active Threat 
.47 .45 .JO -.23 
.62 .25 -.18 
.JB -.24 
.11 
Persuas. 
-.02 
-.11 
-.04 
.01 
.04 
(' n = 152 subjects 
ll <: .05, r. = .28 
p 4.. .01, x: = .32 (for 150 gf, 7 variables) 
Position 
-.04 
-.17 
-.06 
.02 
.04 
.14 
typically used to describe source credibility. The three were 
combined to give an overall source evaluation measure. Activity 
correlated significantly with trustworthiness and competence 
(r = .30 and .JS, ll < .05 and ll <( .01 respectively) but less so 
with intelligence (~ = .25). Activity was not included in the 
overall source rating measure as it was not a usual source credi-
bility measure. The other three measures will be treated 
56 ~-individually. All intercorrelations among the intent to pe~suade, l threat and position scales failed to reach significance, when a 
~ probability loading factor was included. The ~·s varied from .02 
to .14 for these three measures. The correlations between threat 
and the first three sourc~ ratings (trustworthiness, intelligence, 
and competence) were all marginally negative (~ = -.23, -.18, and 
-.24, respectively). This would indicate that there was a tendencr 
to perceive a more threatening source as being less credible. 
Hypothesis eight predicted that high cognitive response will 
result in less favorable source ratings than the low cognitive 
response cells. Thus a main effect of cognitive response was ex-
pected to occur in the source evaluations. A 2X2X2 analysis of 
variance was performed on the source ratings and appears in Table 
7. The F ratios for this main effect in the in'telligence and com-
petence scales as well as in the combined source evaluation 
measure were significant beyond the .Ol level. In addition, the 
scale concerning the evaluation of the source as threatening 
showed a near significant F ratio (F = 2.8, .di = 1/144, p < .10) 
for the cognitive response main effect. By inspection of the 
means found in Table 8 the treatment means of the scales concerned 
with source credibility (trustworthiness, competence and intelli-
gence) were all in the predicted direction. High· cognitive re-
sponse expression resulted in less favorable evaluation of the 
source than low cognitive response. Al~o, Table 8 shows that the 
treatment means of the threat scale were also in the predicted 
direction. Under high cognitive response, the source was viewed 
" "", - "'·r~~~~''i,, l!!IU 'If I I I• 
. '""l\I , 
TABLE 7 
2X2X2 ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS1 
' 
Source of Trust. In tell. Compet. i+2+3 Active Threat 
Variation .Q.!. MS F MS F MS F MS F MS F !Ym F 
Involve-
ment (A) ·1 .8 .8 .• 5 .2 .3 .3 
Cognitive (B) 
8.4a 4.lb 7.2a 2.aa Response 1 9.0 2.2 24.5 11.1 130.8 3,5 .11.1 
Source (C) 
16.6a 5.9b 1J.8a 18.a 55.2a Credibility 1 67.1 17.1 37.0 333.1 162. 4.1 ~ 
-...:i 
AX B 1 .5 8.1 2.8 1.5 21.4 1.9 29.5 7.6a 
AX C l 5.5 1.4 1.1 .5 18.4 13.J 4.5b .5 
B X C .. 1 21.4 5.jb 26.1 9.0a .5 109.4 6.lb 9.0 J.lc 2.9 
iA X B X C 1 3.5 4.8 1.6 7.2 2.7c 45.3 2.5 6.J 2.2 .6 
Within L44 4.1 2.9 2.7 18.1 2.9 3.9 
1N = 152, with 19 Ss in each. treat~ent. 
Only F's greater than unity were reported. The persuasive and position 
scales analyses were not reported, since no F for these scales were greater than 
one. 
a 
:R <: .01, gr_ = 1/144 
b 
:R L.. .05, gt: = 1/144 
c 
:R < .10, Qt.= 1/144 
TABLE 8 
SUMMARY OF MEANSs SOURCE EVALUATION MEASURES 
Treatments Trust, Intell. Compet. Active Threat Persuasive Position 
High Cognitive Response 
Hi Inv Hi Cr So. 4.74 4.oo 4.94 6.74 6.21 6.32 8.24 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So, 4.84 4.68 4.63 6,16 6.06 6.47 8.24 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So. 5.15 4.21 5.42 8.05 5,22 6,95 8,79 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So, 3.89 J.84 4.oo ·5,47 5,37 6.64 8,69 
Low Cognitive Response 
Hi Inv Hi Cr So. 6.16 5,53 5.84 8.16 4.43 6.16 8.64 \J\ CX> 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So. 4.16 J.84 4.42 5,79 4.90 6.69 8.43 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So. .6.21 5,95 5.84 a.21 5,27 6.05 7,85 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So. 4.05 4.63 5,05 5,47 6.oo 7.22 8.74 
Control - 2 Message 4.44 4.89 5.22 6.56 5,56 5,78 7,00 
Notes 
The greater the number, the greater the degree of attribution to the 
source of the particular quality. 
Each Mean based on 19 subjects. 
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threatening than under low cognitive response. This point 
,. will be elaborated upon in the next chapter, due to its importance 
'· :!.~ 
<: 
to the critical evaluative set concept. A DNMRT was performed on 
the source ratings to determine which means accounted for this 
~ main effect. In the trustworthiness and intelligence scales, the 
mean difference between two pairs of parallel means reached signi-
ficance at the .05 level. These were the high involvement, high 
credible source, high and low cognitive response treatments, and 
the low involvement, high credible source, high and low cognitive 
response treatments. The low credible source, low involvement 
treatments followed the same pattern of differences, but the low 
credible source high involvement cells did not. Both of these 
latter effects were not significant for these two measures. These 
I 
two effects were significant at the .10 level for the combined 
source evaluation measure, however. For the threat scale, a DNMRT 
was also performed •. The mean difference be~ween the high involve-
.-
ment high credible source, high and low cognitive response treat-
ments was significant beyond the .05 level and the mean difference 
between the high involvement, low credible source, high and low 
cognitive response treatments was significant at the .10 level. 
Other pairs of parallel treatment means tended slightly in the 
opposite direction. 
None of the other source evaluation scales (activity, persua-
siveness, or the source's position) showed any significance main 
effect due to the cognitive response independent variable. These 
,scales, however, had been considered as less important than the 
0 
credibility scales, in terms of the hypothesis. Thus hypo-
. 
thesis eight was confirmed in the present study. The source 
evaluations were significantly less favorable in the high cogni-
tive response condition than in the low cognitive response condi-
tion. 
~call Measure 
Hypothesis six was concerned with the recall measure, and the 
predictions of hypothesis seven were concerned with the relation-
~ ship between recall and attitude change. Hypothesis six pr~dicted 
that the amount of recall of the persuasive communication would be 
r· 
L 
:--
~,,,_ ..-. 
significantly greater in the high cognitive response treatments 
than in the low cognitive response groups. A 2X2X2 analysis of 
variance was performed on the data obtained from the recall 
measure. This analysis appears in Table 9. A significant main 
effect due to cognitive response appeared (F = J8.6, .si! = l/144a 
p L.. .001). Inspection of the means (Table 5) for recall shows 
that the high cognitive response groups had higher recall than the 
low cognitive response treatments. A DNMRT was performed on the 
recall data. This test demonstrated that the difference between 
all the pairs of parallel cell means were significant beyond the 
.10 level except for the high involvement high credible source 
high and low cognitive response treatments which approached the 
.10 level of significance. Thus the high cognitive response con-
dition did produce greater recall of the persuasive communication 
~·~ 
... : 
' 
!' ' 
.• ~" ~ 
' 
I 
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TABLE 9 
2X2X2 ANALYSIS -OF VARIANCE OF 
THE RECALL MEASURE 
Source of Variation MS 
Involvement (A) 1 .6 
Cognitive Response (B) l 97,9 
Source Credibility (C) l .6 
AX B 1 9,5 
AX C 1 .3 
BX C 1 l.J 
AX BX C 1 ,2 
Within 144 2.5 
a l2 ~ .01, gr = 1/144 
b l2 <.. .10, gr.= 1/144 
Note• 
n = 152 subjects 
,. 
than the low cognitive response condition. Hypothesis six was 
confirmed in the present study, 
Hypothesis seven predicted that there would be a significant 
negative correlation between amount of recall and attitude change. 
Evidence in the present study for this hypothesis came from two 
findings. First, bot.h hypotheses four ~d six were confirmed. 
Hypothesis four predicted that high cognitive response would pro-
duce less attitude change than low cognitive response, whereas 
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hypothesis six predicted that high cognitive response would pro-
duce greater recall than low cognitive response. The main effect 
due to cognitive response in both attitude change and recall were 
significant beyond the .01 level. Thus this evidence points to an 
inverse relationship between attitude change and recall. Secondly 
more direct evidence was obtained from the Pearson Product Corre-
lation Coefficient relating the two variables. For the four atti-
tude scales and recall, the ~·s varied from -.24 to .OJ, with an 
average ~ of -.15, for the total attitude scale and recall, 
r = .181 , indicating that attitude change and recall are negativel 
related. Thus hypothesis seven tended to be confirmed in the 
present study. 
Manipulation Checks 
In order to demonstrate that the v~rious hypotheses were con-
firmed due to the independent variable manipulation, and to inves-
tigate more deeply into the process of attitude change, it is 
necessary to provide evidence that the manipulations were success-
fully performed. 
1The significance level of this correlation coefficient is 
open to interpretation. If the four attitude scales are considere 
as a total attitude measure, and then compared to the one recall 
measure, so that only two measures are being correlated, then the 
relationship is significant at the .05 level. If the four atti-
tude scales are separately correlated with recall, then the aver-
age ~does not quite reach significance at the .05 level, by a 
·conservative probability estimate, taking into consideration the 
probability loading of four correlations· (Guilford, 1965). The 
present author opts for the former interpretation, since the four 
scales when combined give a more comprehensive estimate of each 
subject's attitude than the four measures taken separately. 
6J 
Source credibility.--A 2X2X2 analysis of variance was per-
formed on the seven source evaluations, plus the combined trust-
worthy, intelligence-competence measure, and the results appear i 
Table 7. On the combined measure, a very significant source credi 
bility main effect was noted (F = 18.4; M 1/144, 12 < .Ol). This 
effect was noted for each of the three source measures comprising 
the measure and also for the active measure. The magnitude of the 
F in each case confirms that the source manipulation was success-
ful. Observing the means of each treatment of each measure in 
Table 8 shows that the high credible source was evaluated more 
favorably than the low credible source. Thus the failure to ob-
tain a source main effect on the attitude measures cannot be due 
to an· unsuccessful source manipulation. More will be said con-
cerning this finding in the discussion section of the paper. 
Ego involvement.--Four scales were incorporated into the ex-
periment to measure this variable. These four scales included the 
intensity, importance, involvement, and "tried hard" measures. 
These measures were all considered to .concern a common factor 
involving an emotional aspect. The four scales were intercorre-
lated and these results appear in Table 10. Involvement, inten-
sity and importance correlated very highly, ranging from .62 to 
.75. These three were considered to be measuring a common factor, 
and were combined into one measure. The 2X2X2 analysis of vari-
ance were performed on the four original scales, and on the com-
bined measure, but none of these five analysis produced 
r 
i 
r. 
Importance 
Involvement 
Intensity 
Tried Hard 
Notes• 
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TABLE 10 
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE FOUR VARIABLES 
OF INTENSITY, IMPORTANCE, INVOLVEMENT, 
AND TRIED HARD 
Importance 
Measures 
Involvement Intensity 
.75 .62 
.68 
n = 152 subjects 
~ < .05, !: = .23 
.u ..(. • 01, I: = • 27 (for 150 g:_, four variables) 
Tried Hard 
.27 
.39 
.26 
significant main effects or interactions. There was one margin-
ally significant interaction however. On the impoftance scale, 
the involvement by cognitive response interaction nearly reached 
significance (F = 3.57, U 1/144, l2 ..(_.OB). By inspection of the 
means, found in Table 11, this effect is due to a larger differ-
ence in importance between the high involvement and the low in-
volvement treatments under the high cognitive response than the 
low cognitive response condition. A DNMRT test was performed, 
which showed that this interaction was due largely to a signif i-
. 
cant difference (.u <.10) between the high and low involvement 
condition of the high cognitive response condition for the low 
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TABLE 11 
SUMMARY OF MEANS a EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
Measures 
Treatments Intens. Import. Involv. Tried Hard 
High Cognitive Response 
'· 
Hi Inv Hi Cr So. 8.74 9,74 9.63 10.63 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So, 9.63 10.63 10.58 11.68 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So. 9.42 7.79 9.26 11.54 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So. 9.52 7,79 8.84 11.94 
• Low Cognitive Response 
r t Hi Inv Hi Cr So, 
Hi Inv Lo Cr So. 
Lo Inv Hi Cr So, 
Lo Inv Lo Cr So. 
Control Groups 
One Message 
Two Messages 
Note a 
8.57 
8.63 
9.00 
9,73 
e.39 
9.00 
9.32 
9.05 
9,05 
9.79 
8.94. 
8.94 
Each mean based on 19 subjects. 
11.00 
10.26 
10.26 
10.58 
9,26 
10.11· 
11.00 
10.68 
10.79 
10.95 
ll.00 
10,50 
credible source. Under the low cognitive response condition, the 
two comparable means were not significantly different and the 
direction of the difference was in the opposite direction (i.e., 
the low involvement treatment group rated the importance higher 
than the high involvement group). No i~terpretation was given to 
this finding as there is a possibility that the cognitive response 
by involvement interaction is spurious. A probability level 
r p <.. ,08 could be expected by c~ce, given for analyses, with 
t seven possible effects, were included in this section, 
{ 
~ 
f The two control groups rated the four scales in a manner 
similar to the experimental treatments, and no significant differ-
ences were found when Dunnett tests were performed on these 
measures. 
As a partial manipulation check on the independent variable 
of involvement which would bear direct relevance on these four 
scales, a question was included on the recall page asking the sub 
ject to state the purpose of the study. Only seven out of 152 
subjects failed to indicate the given purpose of the study, or a 
reasonably close approximation of it. This would indicate that 
the involvement manipulation was at least comprehended by 95% of 
the subjects, although the manipulation failed to affect the sub-
jects differentially. 
Cognitive response.--Since the cognitive response manipula-
tion occurred in the directions given to the subjects, the only 
direct check on this manipulation involved the manner in which th 
directions were carried out. Every subject in the high cognitive 
response group wrote down cognitive responses, whereas none of th 
remainder of the subjects did, Thus the manipulation was carried 
out correctly. The results indicate that many dependent measures 
were affected differentially by the two levels of this variable, 
and these differences appear to be due solely to the subjects 
making their cognitive responses to the persuasive communication 
in the high cognitive response condition • 
.Q._ther Results 
The present study found a number of important relationships, 
main effects and interactions which were not directly related to 
the experimental hypotheses, but are worthy of mention as they 
shed light on the process involved in attitude change. 
Intercorrelations among the dependent measures.--After con-
sidering each measure category separately, it became important 
also to demonstrate the interrelatedness between the categories of 
attitudes, source evaluations, emotional involvement ratings, re-
call and cognitive response ratings. These representative correla 
tions are presented in Table 12. 
Attitude favorability was found to correlate highly and posi-
tively with cognitive response favorability (r ~ ;37) which indi-
r 
cates a close association and possibly even a process-product re-
lationship between the two. Attitude favorability was negatively 
correlated to recall, indicating that retention and acceptance of 
a persuasive communication are not at all directly interrelated. 
Recall and cognitive response were also negatively related 
(~ = -.26). Attitude favorability and source favorability were 
positively correlated, though not very highly (~ = .13), which is 
consistent with the low F's obtained for source main effects in 
the analysis of attitude measures. Attitude and emotional involve 
ment (relating to the four measures of intensity, importance, 
TABLE 12 
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
GROUPED IN CATEGORIES 
Range of Average Based on # 
Measures r. r. of Corr. 
Attitude - source evaluation .02 to .22 .lJ 15 
ttitude emotional involi• -.oa to .07 -.02 15 
~ttitude - cognitive resp. .25 to .47 .37 4 
ttitude - recall -.24 to .OJ -.15 4 
· tti tude. - time* 
-.29 to .OJ -.15 4 
ttitude - threat -.23 to .OJ -.11 4 
Source evaluation - emotiin• -.16 to .10 -.01 15 
Source eval. - cog. resp. -.10 to .19 .06 4 
Source eval. - recall -.17 to .OJ -.08 4 
Source evaluation - time -.16 to -.25 -.20 4 
Source evaluation - threat -.11 to -.24 -.19 4 
ognit. Resp. - emotion. inv.* -.09 to .OJ -.04 4 
ognitive response - recall* -.26 -.26 l 
~ognitive response - time* .oo .oo l 
ognitive response - threat* 
- .. 27 -.27 1 
ecall - emotional involve. -.16 to .16 -.05 4 
ecall - time* -.10 -.10 l 
ecall - threat .11 .11 1 
emotional involve.* ... 21 1;() ' .02 -.06 4 
threat* .13 .13 l 
- emotional inv. .06 to .30 .24 4 
otesa 
n = ·152, for each correlation. For those' correlations followed by 
asterisk (*), n = 76 (high cognitive response groups only were measured 
n those scales). 
The ~verage correlations were computed by the ! transformation 
ethod of Guilford, 1965. 
°' Q) 
involvement and tried hard) correlations were slightly negative, 
as were emotional involvement and cognitive response favorability. 
Both of these correlations, while very slight, were in the pre-
dicted direction. That is, as involvement increased, attitude 
' ~· favorability to the communication's position decreased. 
~·· 
Time taken did not correlate with cognitive response favora-· 
bility ratings (i: = .oo), but time correlated negatively with at-
~ titude favorability to a slight extent (i: = -.15). Time correlatel 
r ~\ . negatively (I: = -.20) with source favorability, which might be 
interpreted through a low source evaluative set app~oach • 
ii 
As the ~; .. 
~ 
subject feels less favorable towards the source, he tends to spend 
~" ~" 
more time evaluating the source's communication, more critically 
~. studying it, and he tends to take longer writing his responses to 
·that communication. 
Threat correlated negatively w_i th attitude fa vora bili ty 
(I:= -.11) and with cognitive response favorability (x: = -.27) 
which is consistent with an approach which views the process of 
attitude change in terms of bolstering one's position and develop-
ing counter-arguments to resist persuasion when threatened. Threa~ 
correlated positively with emotional involvement (x: = .24), which 
is consistent with the approach of this paper, Threat correlated 
negatively with source favorability (i: = -.19) which would indi-
cate that the lower the evaluation of the source .bY the subject, 
the greater the perceived threat. This '.could be interpreted as 
source derogation, due to threat, but other interpretations arJ 
also equally plausible. 
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Significant interactions found in the attitude measures.--
Table 2 also shows a significant cognitive response by source in-
teraction for the total attitude measure. (F = 3.08, gJ:, = 1/144, 
p < .10.) This interaction reached the .05 level of significance 
for the first attitude scale and tended in the same direction, but1 
~· nonsignificantly for the other three scales. Basically, this in-
r:: 
~·.· teraction effect was due to a tendency for the high credible 
~. 
,•'. 
' ,• source to produce a more favorable attitude than the low credible 
source under the high cognitive response conditions, whereas with 
low cognitive response condition, the low source produced a 
slightly more favorable attitude. 
The involvement by cognitive response interaction reached 
significance on the first and fourth attitude scales, but not on 
the total attitude scale. All attitude scales·e~cept the second 
attitude measure showed the same tendency, namely, under the low 
cognitive response condition, low ego involvement ,produced more 
attitude change than high involvement, whereas, under high cogni-
tive response a smaller trend in the opposite direction occurred. 
Both the involvement by cognitive response and the cognitive 
response by source interactions failed to produce any significant 
differences between any two critical relevant treatment means, 
when the DNMRT test was performed on the treatment means. This 
would imply that these interactions were due to ~he combining of 
two.means for each point of the two-way·interac\ion, and that the 
effects are therefore general, and the variance 'is not due solely 
\ 
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to one treatment mean being significantly higher or lower than 
the others. 
The two message control group, incorporating both the objec• 
tively worded first message and the discrepant persuasive second 
message, without any source given or purpose of the study given, 
produced a more favorable attitude toward the persuasive communi-
cation than any of the other treatments. The mean of this contro 
group, by the Dunnett test was significantly greater than the 
means of only the high cognitive response, low source, high or lo 
involvement treatments. The one message control group, having 
only the objectively worded message, produced a less favorable 
attitude than all but the low involvement, high cognitive respons 
low credible source treatment, by inspection of the means. The 
results of the Dunnett test showed that the one message control 
group was significantly lower than the low involvement, low cogni 
tive response, .low credible source treatment, and the two message 
control group. The four individual attitude scales show basicall 
the same trends, and the same significant differences between the 
control groups and the treatment means. The data from all atti-
tude measures, with the exception of the third attitude scale 
demonstrate a significant difference between the two control 
groups, thus confirming that the inclusion of the persuasive com-
munication (the second message) did produce an attitude signifi-
cantly more favorable to the source ·than ~he first message alone. 
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Significant interactions present in the source evaluation 
cases, tended in the opposite direction. 
There was a marginal involvement by cognitive response inter-
action which appeared on the "intelligent" scale (F = 2,?6, 
!!!. = 1/144, p < .10). This effect was due largely to an increase 
in favorability in source evaluation from low involvement to high 
involvement for the high cognitive response groups, whereas under 
low cognitive response, the low involvement groups rated the 
source more favorably than the high involvement subjects. The 
ti threat" source scale showed also the same involvement by cogni-
tive res ,onse interaction but to a hi her level of significance 
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(~ = 7.56, Qi= 1/144, ~ L.•01). Tha effect occurred in the same 
direction as the "intelligent" scale. Under high cognitive re-
sponse, the high involvement groups rated the source as more 
threatening than the low involvement group, and under low cogni-
tive response, the low involvement groups rated the source as more 
threatening. 
A DNMRT was performed on both these scales but no relevant 
treatment mean difference reached significance. Again, the inter-
action is due to the summation of two means for each point of the 
interaction, and is not the result of one mean accounting for an 
excessive amount of the variance. 
Finally, there was a significant cognitive response by sourc 
interaction present in the active scale (F = 4.53, g!, = 1/144, 
R ~. 05). In this case, the interaction was due to a lessening ofl 
source differences under high cognitive response conditions, rela-
tive to the low cognitive response condition. The main reason fo 
this lessening of source differences in the high cognitive response 
condition concerned the two high involvement treatments only. 
That is, the difference in evaluating the source as active, for 
the high source relative to the low source under the high involve 
ment high cognitive response condition was relatively small, 
whereas the differences between the .high and low source for the 
low involvement high cognitive response group and the high or low 
involvement low cognitive response grou~s were significantly 
greater (12 <: • 05 - DNMRT). 
7 
The persuasive and sources• position scales produced no sig-
nificant main effects or interaction, and no further analysis was 
performed on these scales. 
The two message control groups included the same source evalu; 
ation scales, but without an identified source. That is, the sub-
jects were asked to rate the sources only on the basis of the com-
munication which was attributed to an unidentified source. On the 
first five source evaluation scales (trust, intelligent, competent:, 
active and threat), the control groups rated the unidentified 
source less favorably than the high credible source groups and more 
favorably than the low credible source groups. That is, the mean 
source evaluation of the control group for these scales fell in 
between the marginal means of the groups receiving a high crediblel 
or a low credible source biography. On the remaining two scales, 
the control groups rated the source as less persuasive and as 
having a more moderate position than either the high or low cred-
,. 
ible source. 
It is interesting to note that in the two scales (intelligent 
and competent) in which the cognitive response variable main ef:fec 
was highly significant, the control group rated the source in a 
manner more similar to the low cognitive response group than to 
the high cognitive response group. This lends some support to the 
prediction that under high cognitive response conditions, the 
source will be devalued relative to· the ~ow cognitive response 
groups. 
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Significant interactions appearing in the recall mea§ure.--A 
2x2x2 analysis of variance was performed on the recall data. In 
addition to the previously mentioned main effect due to cognitive 
response, a near significant involvement by cognitive response in 
i teraction was present (F = J.75, .Qi= 1/144, p < .08). In the 
~, 
high cognitive response group, low involvement produced a greater 
amount of recall than high involvement, whereas under low cogni-
tive response, high involvement produced a larger recall score 
than low involvement. Again the direction of this interaction is 
exactly the reverse of that demonstrated in the attitude measures. 
By inspection of the treatment means (Table 5) for recall, this 
interaction was not due to any one specific treatment mean ac-
counting for the variance, but was due to the combination of all 
relevant means taken together. 
Time.--The last dependent variable to be considered was a 
time measure. This measure applies only to the high response 
groups, and represents the time from the beginning of the experi-
ment to the completion of the final at.ti tude scale. It was as-
sumed that the largest part of the variability in this measure 
would be due to the time taken to write the cognitive responses. 
If the measure showed significant main or interaction effects, 
these could be interpre.ted as indicating that the cognitive re-
sponse manipulation was not consistent or constant for all and 
that those who took longer or shorter to write responses could be 
considered as separate treatments, subject selected and controlled,, 
,. 
• which would jeopardize the standardization and interpretation of 
the variables. One could ask in ·such a situation, was the effect 
t• 
due to the independent predetermined variables, or was it due to a 
time factor. That is, are the resulting differences ·1n time merely 
random effects, irrelevant to the independent and dependent vari-
ables? To answer these questions, a 2X2 analysis of variance was 
performed on the h.igh cognitive response groups {the only group 
whose times were recorded), and the results of this analysis indi-
cated that no main effects or interactions were found to be signi-
ficant {largest F = 2.27, df = 1/76, p < .15, for involvement>. 
The treatment means for this time measure appears in Table 5. 
In conclusion, the analysis of 
indicated that hypotheses one, two, 
the data of this present stud~ 
three and nine were not con- I 
I 
firmed but hypotheses four, five, six, seven and eight were con-
firmed. 
.. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
F. 
: · Critical Evaluative Sets and j;he Hypotheses 
' ...... ,_ 
The purpose of this research was to delve more deeply into 
the process of attitude change, and to demonstrate the existence 
of four critical evaluative sets which cause the subject to view 
the persuasive communication from a more critical perspective. 
Thes~ critical evaluative sets cause the subject to place the 
position of the persuasive communication in his latitude of rejec-
tion, and therefore, less attitude change results. The four 
· critical evaluative sets are high ego invo1vernent, low source 
credibility-, high cognitive responding, and in .a particular condi-
.tio~, the high credible source as threat. ·The hypotheses of the 
study were proposed as tests of the validity of these critical 
evaluative sets. 
High ego involvement critical evaluative set.--The first hy-
pothesis concerns the high ego involvement critical evaluative set. 
The differences in attitude change between high and low involve-
ment, summed over the source credibility and cognitive response 
conditions while in the predicted direction, was not statistically 
significant. This is an unexpected finding. Two previous 
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r studies - Scileppi. (1971) using?: nearly identical involvement 
~· 1: i manipulation, and Johnson and Scileppi (1969) using a similar 
manipulat!on - found the expected involvement main effects. How-
ever, in the present study, since hypothesis one was not confirmed,, 
the high involvement critical evaluative set was not demonstrated. 
Reasons for this failure to confirm will be given later in this 
chapter. 
Low credible source evaluative set.--The third hypothesis was 
concerned with the low credible source evaluative set. The analy-
sis of the data failed to confirm this hypothesis. The difference 
in attitude change between the high and low credible source, 
summed over all levels of the involvement and cognitive response 
variable was not statistically significant. The lack of confirma-
tion of this hypothesis is surprising, since the vast majority of 
research involving source credibility has demonstrated that the 
low credible source produces less attitude c·hange ·than the high 
credible source. In the pilot study of the present research 
(Scileppi, 1971), a source credibility main effect had been found, 
which gave credence to the low credible source critical evaluative 
set concept. In the present research, however, since the third 
hypothesis had not been confirmed, the low credible source evalua 
tive set had not been demonstrated. The reasons for the failure 
to confirm the existence of this set will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
As was previously mentioned, the low source credibility and· 
r high involvement critical evalu::ive sets were thought to be re-
r lated in a non-additive manner. That is, if one critical evalua-
f ~· tive set was present, the presence of the other would not lower 
attitude change any further. Thus either set acted to produce a 
threshold in an all-or-nothing situation. This relationship was 
tested in hypothesis two. A source by involvement interaction was 
expected. This interaction was highly significant (F = 8.35, 
fil'.. = 1/136; l! ~ .01) in the Scileppi (1971) study. In the present 
study, this interaction was not significant and from the graph of 
the total attitude measure (Figure 1), nothing similar to the pre-
dicted interaction appeared. Thus this hypothesis was not con-
firmed, and the predicted relationship between the two critical 
evaluative sets was not demonstrated. The reasons for this 
appear to be contained in the reasons given for the failure of the 
two critical evaluative sets taken separately. If the two critica 
evaluative sets did not produce the desired results, then the in-
.-
teraction between the two would also be ineffective in producing 
the predicted effects. 
' High cognitive response evaluative set.--The fourth hypothesi 
was concerned with the high cognitive response critical evaluative 
set. Thus a main effect due to cognitive response was expected 
such that less attitude· change would occur under high cognitive 
response condition rather than under low cognitive response. The 
results of the present study confirmed the prediction of the hypo-
thesis. The difference in attitude change between high and low 
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cognitive response, summed over the involvement and source.credi-
bility conditions, was statisticaily significant at the .01 level, 
and in the predicted direction. Thus the hypothesis was confirmed, 
and the high cognitive response critical evaluative set was demon 
strated in the present study. 
It was also expected that high cognitive response would not 
only decrease attitude change, but would also cause the subjects 
in this condition to derogate the source. Thus the high cognitivei 
response critical evaluative set would also affect the source 
ratings. This was the prediction of hypothesis eight. The analy-
sis of the results of this study indicate a significant main effec 
of cognitive response in the combined source evaluation ratings. 
The difference in the source evaluation ratings between the high 
and low cognitive response treatments, summed over involvement an 
source credibility were statistically significant, and in the pre-
dicted direction. Thus hypothesis eight was confirmed, and anothe 
r 
effect of the cognitive response critical evaluative set was 
demonstrated. 
High credible source as threat critical evaluative set.--The 
author's main purpose in preparing this research was to investi-
gate the high credible source as threat critical evaluative set. 
The conditions for the ·existence of this set were carefully con-
sidered. It was believed that giv~n the high involvement set, the 
subjects would be motivated to critically evaluate the material. 
Then, if the subjects were instructed to write down their response' 
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to the persuasive communication, they would be better able to 
elaborate upon their more critica1 responses, and to convince 
~ ~· themselves of the validity of their own arguments. Furthermore, 
with these two critical evaluative sets established, the subjects 
would view the author of the persuasive communication as an oppo-
nent, proposing a view discrepant from their own. A debate situa-
tion would result. If the author of the persuasive communication 
was considered to be a strong opponent, then the subject, already 
motivated to defend his own position, would view the high credible 
source as a greater threat, and therefore become more concerried to 
maintain his initial stand on the issue. Furthermore, the subject 
in this situation is likely to see the position of the source to 
be more discrepant from his own position than it actually is, and 
some polarization might occur. This might a~tually cause a mild 
source boomerang effect to be present, such that the subject would 
develop an attitude less favorable to the sourc~•s position than 
.. 
his initial attitude (after reading only the objective message). 
Thus the high credible source as threat critical evaluative set 
was expected to produce an even less favorable attitude than the 
low credible source evaluative set, in this particular condition. 
Hypothesis nine tested this prediction. A three-way interac-
tion was expected, in which the high credible source, high involve~ 
ment, high cognitive response treatment would result in less atti-
tude change than the low source in a parallel condition, and lower 
than all other conditions. The results of this experiment did no1 
confirm this hypothesis. The three-way interaction did not 
r-----------~82 __________ ---r 
~· r approach significance. The mean attitude change of the critical 
treatment was actually greater than that of the low credible source 
in the parallel treatment. Thus the results of this experiment 
did not demonstrate the existence of the high credible source as 
threat critical evaluative set. This again is a surprising find-
ing. The pilot study demonstrated a near significant three-way 
interaction, with the mean attitude change in the critical condi-
tion smaller than that for every other treatment. Reasons for the 
failure of this present study to demonstrate the existence of this 
critical evaluative set will be given later in the paper. 
Thus, the high cognitive response critical evaluative set was 
demonstrated in the present experiment, whereas the low credible 
source, high involvement, and high credible source as threat 
critical evaluative sets were not demonstrated. 
In the following section, the relationship between the analy-
sis of the data and the hypotheses of the study wfll be demon-
strated, and compared with a previous pilot study involving the 
same variables. Reasons for the failure in some cases to demon-
. 
strate the hypotheses, and potentially successful lines for future 
research will be discussed. The results in terms of the two main 
approaches of the study will be discussed. 
The first hypothesis predicted that there would be a main 
effect due to ego involvement, such tha~ low involvement would 
produce a more favorable attitude than high involvement. This 
hypothesis was not confirmed. This result is surprising, in view 
of the fact that the pilot study demonstrated a very significant 
BJ 
main effect due to involvement, and in the proper direction. The 
involvement manipulation was nearly identical to the earlier study. 
r t Only apparently minor phrases were changed, while the meaning of 
the content of the passage was retained in toto. One possible dif-
ference involves the histqrical circumstances. The pilot study 
was conducted in the Fall semester, 1970. The subjects, coming to 
the sessions of the first study, were being constantly bombarded 
with political campaigning for the November elections. Two stu-
dents at Loyola University of Chicago were running for local alder.-
manic positions. Many students were greatly involved in political 
action, but were unable to vote because of t~eir age. Also, stu-
dent sentiment was high on the age of voting issue, as the Illinois 
Constitution referendum vote on this issue occurred in early Fall, 
and the twenty-one year old age limit was retained. The involve-
ment manipulation made salient the relationship between the actual 
voting age requirement and the pilot study. 
~ 
By the second semester, however, when the present study was 
undertaken, interest in politics sagged, and no elections were 
forthcoming. The procedures for amending the Federal Constitution 
regarding the decrease in the age requirement were well under way, 
and as the issue was swiftly being resolved in favor of youth, in-
terest and discussions declined greatly. Thus as the issue was no 
longer as important as before, and the manipulation relating the 
issue to the experiment was not as fruitful as it had previously 
been. The fact that the manipulation was comprehended and re-
tained was not at issue. Over 95% of the subjects recalled the 
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study in the Fall of 1969, research was undertaken which involved L 
fictitious miracle food supplement named REMOH, which, according 
to the invented description, would alleviate hunger, but as of the 
time of writing, was still experimental in nature, and required 
further testing. Midway through this carefully planned research, 
the Food and Drug Administration banned cyclamates.from the public 
market, as insufficient research had been performed on the drug. 
In the succeeding sessions of the experiment, the subject's atti-
tude toward REMOH became erratic, and the data was uninterpretable 
The second hypothesis predicted a source by involvement in-
teraction, under low cognitive response, such that the high credi-
ble source would produce a more favorable attitude under low ego 
involvement, but not under high involvement. The results of this 
experiment did not confirm this hypothesis. This lack of confir-
mation is also surprising. Scileppi (1971) reported a highly sig-
nificant source, by involvement effect, as did other researchers 
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previously. Again, very little was modified, and, with the excep-
tion of the change in historical circumstances mentioned previous 
none of the modifications could have been responsible for the in-
teraction to disappear. At this point, the best explanation would 
include the difficulties in the involvement manipulation, mentione 
above. Yet this is not entirely satisfactory, as those diffi-
culties cannot explain why the low involvement condition produced 
negative source differences (i.e., the low credible source tended 
l to produce a more favorable attitude than the high credible 
f. ! source) instead of an increase or spreading apart of the usual 
' 
source differences. The problem may also lie in the source mani-
pulation as well. The problem will be discussed in terms of the 
third hypothesis mentioned below. 
The third hypothesis predicted that the high credible source 
would produce a more favorable attitude than the low credible 
source. Again-this experiment failed to confirm this prediction, 
although the pilot study produced a near significant main effect 
due to source credibility. The source credibility manipulation 
itself was not at fault. The subjects differentiated the high an 
low credible source on such scales as trustworthy, intelligent, 
competent, and active, at the .05 level of significance or better, 
as the subjects in the pilot study had done on similar scales. 
Either the subjects of the present study dissociated the source 
from the communication, or other factors were present which cause 
the subjects not to regard the source biography when rating their 
opinions concerning the message. These factors might include 
' 
r-~--------------------~8~6----------------------_, 
demand characteristics, or a decrease in the plausibility of the 
manipulation, or of the experiment as a whole. The wording of the 
source manipulation was basically the same as in the pilot study. 
Demand characteristics should have been basically the· same in the 
two studies. One minor difference which may have affected demand 
characteristics appeared in the low credible source biography. A 
section was added in order to strengthen the low source's bad 
qualities, which may have actually produced the opposite effect. 
The sentence stated that the individual who wrote the cornmunica-
tion had run unsuccessfully for a small public office in another 
state, and apparently others in that locality had not placed much 
trust or confidence in him. Some subjects.may have perceived that 
the manipulatton was intending to produce sympathy .,for the source,. 
rather than a lower evaluation. The pilot study did not include 
such a statement. Also, there may have been a certain amount of 
incredulity on the part of some subjects due to. the same low credi-
bie source biography. The subjects were informed that a particula~ 
town resident wrote the persuasive communication as a letter to a 
local newspaper, and that the source biography was included in 
that letter. Some subjects may have wondered why the source would 
include such information about himself, and his unsuccessful po-
litical career and the ill-feeling directed him at his former 
residence. It could be inferred from the source biography that 
the source wished to escape that publicily, and that he therefore 
recently moved, Some subjects may have questioned why the author 
would want to print this information in the local newspaper. The 
87 
subjects may have seen this as implausible, and perceived that 
theY were being "taken•'' and that· there were other more personal 
variables under investigation in the present study. This one 
statement in the source biography was meant to increase the source· 
differences, but it may have caused new factors to exist in the 
eyes of the subject, which would partially explain the higher 
variability in their responses to the attitude scales. 
A possible reason for the apparent failure of both the source 
and involvement manipulation to produce the desired effect, and 
for the failure to replicate the same effects of these variables 
present in the pilot study may have been a slight modification in 
the procedure. In the pilot study, the low and high cognitive 
response conditions were performed separately. This procedure was 
undertaken since there was a noticeable difference in the time 
needed to complete the separate conditions, and if both groups 
were present in the same session, the low cognitive response sub-
.. 
jects would possibly wonder what the others were doing, and why 
they were taking longer, and if there were pages missing in their 
own experimental booklets. This procedure, however, had two no-
ticeable flaws. The subjects were not fully randomized, as in an 
given session, the booklets for only half the treatments were 
present; and also, the experimenter knew which condition - high o 
low cognitive response - was being given to the subjects, and the 
researcher's own bias (Rosenthal, 1966) could in.fluence the sub-
jects' results. This was a particular problem, as slightly diffe 
ent instructions were given to the subjects in the high cognitive 
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f. · response group. Namely, the subjects in the high cognitive re-
sponse groups were asked to raise their hand when they came across 
a check mark in the booklet, and at that· time the researcher would 
take their cognitive response page, and mark the time. In the lo~ 
cognitive response sessions, these instructions were not given, 
and different subtle and unconscious cues may have been given to 
the two groups separately, and in a manner producing the hypothe-
sized results. The fact that the pilot study did produce cogni-
tive response main effects and certain interaction effects would 
be consistent with this interpretation, and to eliminate this con-
founding factor, as well as the flaws mentioned previously, the 
present study had both conditions present in the same session. In 
order to have both groups present, the subjects in the present 
study were informed that there were various forms of the.experimen~ 1 
and that others in the room would be doing slightly different 
tasks. This may have created an "experimental se~," that is, the 
subjects were "keyed" to the study as a psychological experiment, 
and this set may have decreased the plausibility of the high in-
volvement purpose of the study, In the first study, the subjects 
were more able to believe that this study was sponsored by a 
Federal agency concerned with voting requirements. In the preseni 
study, this may have been less believable, and many subjects may 
have doubted its authenticity. All other aspects of the procedure 
of the present study remained unchanged' from the pilot study. The 
experimenter was the same throughout all sessions, and was dressec 
.in the.same manner. 
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The fourth hypothesis predicted that the low cognitive re-
. 
sponse groups would produce a more favorable attitude than the 
high cognitive response group. This hypothesis was definitely 
confirmed in the present experiment. This fact discounted the 
possibility that the main effect of cognitive response found in 
the pilot study was due to an experimenter bias effect or artifact. 
The results of this experiment support the concept that cognitive 
response expression facilitation does act as a critical evaluative 
set. Requesting that an individual respond in writing to each of 
a list of arguments discrepant with his original position does ap-
pear to help motivate the person to rehearse and develop his argu-
ments to a greater extent than if the person merely read the argu-
ments. The fact that the high cognitive re.sponse condition did 
result in an attitude less favorable to the source than the low 
cognitive response group also indicates that the subjects became 
more critical of the persuasive communication as a result of 
.. 
writing his responses. More support for this concept of high cog-
nitive response as critical evaluative set will be discussed when 
considering hypotheses five, six and eight. 
Hypothesis five predicted that the cognitive response favora 
bility ratings would correlate positively with attitude favorabil-
ity. The results of this study confirm this hypothesis. The 
average correlation between the cognitive favorability ratings an 
attitude favorability was positive, and "significant beyond the .o 
level. This finding gives further support to Greenwald's (1968) 
theory relating cognitive.responses to attitude. The relationsh~~ 
~­( 
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can be interpreted as a process-product relationship; that is, th 
cognitive responses of the subject helped to determine the sub-
ject's attitude on the issue. 
In considering the process-product relationship, the stochas 
tic model, as proposed by ~ocial learning theory, is relevant. 
McGuire (1968), using this model, considers that the attitude for 
mation process can be broken down into two basic categories -
comprehension-retention and acceptance. In this study, the recal 
measure involved the first category. This measure will be de-
scribed below, in hypotheses six and seven. These cognitive re-
sponse ratings, however, can be considered as a reasonable measur · 
of the acceptance factor of the attitude change process. The hig 
positive relationship between cognitive response and attitude can 
be seen therefore as demonstrating a potentially causal relation-
ship between the two variables. 
The cognitive response ratings are interesting for another 
reason. They are both self-generated in part, and yet, they are 
also the result of the independent variable manipulation, and the 
arguments contained in the persuasive communication, which are 
treatment induced. For example, the pilot study demonstrated tha 
in the analysis of these ratings, a main effect due to involvement 
was found, and in the present study, a significant source by in-
volvement interaction was reported. Cognitive responses can be 
seen, therefore, as both an independent variable, and a mediating 
variable, affected by other independent variables. Greenwald has 
concentrated on cognitive responses as an independent variable, 
91 r ~· whereas the present researcher has discussed these responses from 
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both perspectives. 
A point could be made here concerning the potential inter-
action or association between the act of rating the cognitive re-
sponses and then the subjects responding to the attitude scales. 
In other words, is the high correlation between the cognitive re-
sponses and attitude due to a consistency in rating, or is it due 
to the cognitive responses and real attitudes. Bern (1965, 1967) 
would possibly interpret the results in terms of his self-persua-
sion model. That is, a subject makes his cognitive responses to 
the communication, and then rates them. He may then feel that if 
he rated his cognitive responses in such a way, then that rating 
must have been his attitude toward the issue. The present study 
attempted to demonstrate that this is not the case since the sub-
. ject first wrote his cognitive responses, then rated two attitude 
scales, then rated his cognitive responses, and finally, complete 
~ 
two additional attitude scales. Since there were high positive 
correlations between the first two and the last two attitude 
measures, the rating of the cognitive responses itself could not 
have greatly influenced the attitude ratings per se, but it is a 
plausible position to state that the first two attitude scale 
ratings could have influenced both the cognitive response ratings 
and the last two attitude measures. To answer this argument in 
future research, it would be necessary to.have the cognitive re-
sponse ratings rated by independent judges, rather than by the 
subjects themselves. This had not been previously done, since 
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Greenwald {1968) reported a very high correlation between self 
ratings and the judge's· rating of these cognitive responses, and 
the real problem had not been perceived clearly, Perhaps, howeverr 
to fully dismiss the possible objections of Bem and others, rating 
of the cognitive responses by independent judges only should be . 
performed. 
The sixth hypothesis predicted that there would be a signifi-
cant main effect of cognitive response on recall, with high cogni-
tive response groups having greater recall than the low cognitive 
response groups. This hypothesis was definitely confirmed in the 
present study. This would imply that while writing cognitive re-
sponses decreased favorable attitude change, it also had the effect 
of increasing the retention of the persuasive communication. It I 
would be interesting in future research, to explore the persistence 
of resisting persuasion. A subject who is encouraged to cogni-
tively respond or to counterargue in writing has to consider both 
sides thoroughly. He actively understands, retains, and then re-
jects the opposing position, rather than passively discounting it. 
Perhaps, in time, when similar arguments are presented, this active 
rejection will produce in the subject a greater degree of confi-
dence in his own position, and he will fee1·1ess inclined to be 
swayed by new arguments. This has some similarities to McGuire's 
Innoculation principle {1964), but it differs in the fact that the 
. 
resistance to future persuasion will result from the encouragemen1 
to counterargue from the cognitive response process itself. Such I 
a confirmation in future research would have many practical as 
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well as theoretical consequences and applications. 
The seventh hypothesis predicted that attitude change would 
be negatively correlated with recall. The hypothesis tended to be 
confirmed. Thus recall per se is a poor indicator of· attitude 
change, and as the study predicted and confirmed, the relationship 
between the two tends to be negative, at least in this case. In 
terms of McGuire's model, retention is by far a less significant 
component of attitude than is acceptance. In his stochastic 
model, recall of material is only seen as a necessary but not suf-
ficient factor in attitude formation; that is, once a certain 
level of retention is reached, recall becomes less important in 
determining attitude formation and change. The negative relation-
ship that was found in the present study could be due to the fact 
that all subjects reached at least this necessary level of reten-
tion of the persuasive communication for understanding to take 
place. It appears that the subjects went far beyond this minimal 
level. 
As the subject more fully understood the communication, the 
more able he was to counterargue against it, and he was less af-
fected by the communication. To further clarify the process of 
cognitive responding in the relationship between recall and atti-
tude change, cognitive response ratings correlated -.26 with re-
call and +.37 with attitude favorability. Thus the process of at-
titude favorability. Thus the process o1 attitude change is more 
dependent on acceptance, as viewed by the cognitive response rat-
ings than upon retention, as measured by recall. Thus, it is 
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possible for a negative relationship to exist between retention 
and attitude change, particularly if more than a minimal level of 
retention necessary for understanding is attained by most subjects. 
To further demonstrate the importance of the cognitive re-
sponse variable in the process of evaluating the communicator as 
well as the communication, the eighth hypothesis predicted that 
there would be a main effect of cognitive response on the sub-
ject's analysis of the source, such that, under low cognitive re-
sponse, the subject would view the source more favorably than 
under high cognitive response. This hypothesis was also confirmed~ 
This indicates that as the individual cognitively responded (and 
since all the subjects tended to oppose the persuasive communica-
tion), or counterargued against the communication, he tended to 
devalue the author of the communication. Thus, not only did he 
show a less favorable attitude toward the position of the communi-
cation, but he also derogated the source. If the process of atti-
tude formation and change were seen analagously as a pressure 
model, it could be inferred that as the pressure or the motivation 
to reject the communication increases, this pressure can be 
channeled or relieved in at least two directions, source deroga-
tion and resistance to persuasion. Furthermore, the variable of 
cognitive response affects both channels in the same manner. This 
pressure model analogy could shed light on the many failures of 
manipulations to produce attitude changes, in this study as well 
as others. Possibly, if all other channels were defined and 
measured, and then possibly covaried, better studies of attitude 
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change process would occur. Steiner and Johnson (1964) using a 
. 
similar model in a cognitive dissonance study had produced results 
compatible with this reasoning. 
The ninth hypothesis predicted that there would ·be less 
favorable attitude and less favorable cognitive response ratings 
for the high credible source, high ego involvement, high cognitive 
response treatment than for the low credible source under the same 
conditions. This hypothesis is based on the concept that the high 
source in this condition would be viewed as a threat. Although 
there was a slightly greater evaluation of the source as threaten-
ing in the relevant high credible source treatment than in the lo~ 
source condition, both the attitude favorability and cognitive re-
sponse ratings between the two relevant statements were in the 
wrong direction. Thus, the hypothesis was not confirmed. The 
reason for the failure to demonstrate the validity of this high 
source as threat set concept probably lies in the failure to sue-
r 
cessfully achieve the high involvement effect, and the correct 
source credibility manipulation differences, as mentioned previ-
ously. It is interesting to note that in the pilot study, the at-
titude favorability differences were in the correct direction, al-
though not significantly, and a modification in the involvement 
and source manipulation were included in order to heighten this 
effect. 
It is interesting to note that in the cognitive response 
rating, the high credible source, low involvement treatment re-
sulted in.a less favorable rating that the low credible source in 
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the same condition, and that this difference was significant be-
yond the .05 level of the DNMRT. Perhaps the reasoning for this 
concept is correct, but the relevant conditions for its manifesta-
tion are wrong. In other words, perhaps the high source is seen 
as a threat, and in a high cognitive response expression condition;, 
the subject is motivated to cognitively respond to degrade the 
source's position, but that high involvement as manipulated, may 
confuse the subject who is interested more in making a correct and 
intelligent decision, and in this situation he may be swayed more 
by the high credible source. 
More research needs to be performed here, and other factors 
may be involved before the specific conditions for this set are 
determined. At this point, the only statement that can be made is 
I 
that the results of this study have failed to confirm this hypo-
thesis, and that the specific conditions did not produce the pre-
dicted results needed to demonstrate the existence of this set. 
~ 
Thus, because of the flaws of this experiment, and the failure 
to achieve the desired source and involvement effects on attitude 
change, little light can be shed concerning the social judgment 
approach to attitudes. The pilot study and the Johnson and 
Scileppi (1969) study can be readily interpreted as supporting 
this approach, and the ~valuative set concepts consistent with the 
approach, as described in the introduction of this paper. Possi-
ble reasons for the failure of the study to support the approach 
have been given, along with suggested solutions. 
The researcher has a belief. that the approach will be 
~f' 
verified when better experiments are devised, which will occur as 
the result of the experience gain~d by conducting experiments sue 
as the present one. 
Greenwald's cognitive response approach to attitude formatio 
and change has been utilized successfully in this study. The hig 
cognitive response as a critical evaluative set concept has been 
found useful in interpreting the results of this study. 
Future lines of research studying this concept as an inde-
pendent as well as a mediating variable would prove fruitful in 
the understanding of the attitude formation·and change process. 
Also, it appears to be imperative to develop better means of 
measuring and analyzing the emotional involvement - intensity 
states of the subject, if research delving into the process of 
attitude change relevant to evaluative sets is to be successful. 
It is the belief of the present author that such research needs t 
be performed to clarify the processes which produce the attitude 
change. 
Finally, research demonstrating that such factors as percep-
tual sets and cognitive responding are significant determinants o 
attitude change has ramifications extending into the realm of 
philosophical psychology. These factors give credence to the vie 
of man as an active organism. Research on perceptual sets indi-
cates that the orientation a person establishes towards a stimulu 
will affect his response to that stimulus. Also, research on cog 
. 
nitive responding demonstrates that a person does not passively 
accept new information, but actively processes it, and contrasts 
~~ 
the new information with previous information in his cognitive 
system. The present researcher believes that the stimulus - re-
sponse model of social psychological research is inadequate in th 
study of attitude change, and that a more phenomenological stimu-
lus ·- organism - response model, with a heavy emphasis on the 
active organism, offers the promise of a more comprehensive grasp 
of the field. 
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A certain large company wishes to establish a rectory and a research 
center in a certain small town, in a rural area of the state. The town is a 
poor town, as over half its citizens are in the lowest socio-economic claes. 
'.rhe town 1 s population has been dwindling slowly, from over 4500 people in 
1960 to 3100 people, according to the 1970 census. An above averc>.f;e pe1·cent-.nge 
of"the ad~lt males are presently listed as unemployed. The townspeople are 
interested in maintaidng the town 1 s quaint a.tmosphore as it is, and yet they 
are equally interested in preventing the town frcm becoming a ghost town, as 
has happened in similar places. \<~hen the town council (the legislative body 
of the to~m) was approar.hr:Jd by representatives of the cornpam•" and asked if 
certain zoning laws could be char.ged to permit the building cf th!! factor/ 
in the town, the council mad~ no initi?J. evaluation on the cc-rrpany 1s request, 
but dµ,cided to fcrm a fact-findiI'g ccrr.Jllittee to d:l.sc,.,ver co;ne objective 
infor~e.tion about the company. The tmm 1s fact-find~.n~ ccrr:mittee reported 
that the co.:r,par.y, inco1IJ01·atcj in 1961 , has shown a high re.te of p~,·ofi t and 
growth over the last dcc-'l.de. The compa.:iy has registol.'ed a large number of 
patents, and over t.1ro-thirdJ of the p·~oducts resulting from these patents have 
large and increasir.g rnarl•et.s, toth domestic and foreiG::i. The con:pany is in 
urgent need to e~-pand its facilities to tap these llllU'kets.· 
The committee also found that the conpeny pays its empl<'.'yees an above 
average wage, and ezrployce f!'inge benefits are rated as 11re'->~ectable" on 
industry wide criteria.. ro1• the five '3ites on L>Jhich ths ccrr.pany has built 
similcr facilities i:.1 t!!a last three years, the average cost of the buildings 
has been in the ne:i.gh0orhood cf 'two and one-half million do3.lars, and the 
number of men e~ploycd has bGen approxim~tely 550, of which 390 are unskiJJ.ed 
or semi-skilled workers. · 
Since the collllllittee's task,on1y consisted of presenting obj~ctive 
information to the r,ouncil, it did not make any judgment on the feasibility 
of tho coillpany 1s proposal for the town. The town council chose to involve 
the whole town in dccidi::i.g upon tha proposal, and a special election was 
scheduled. The issue is an importa..'1t one, as it affects the towu as ·a whole, 
and each individual resident in many ways. 
'.rhe town 1s one newspaper decided not to publicly.take sides, but to 
allow all the citi::iens to e;.-press their views o:i.1. the issue. In a special 
edition, the ne::sp.?.per encoi.i:::·aged the residents to write letters expressjng 
their views on the con::>a=-~Y 1 s propos3.l, and thes·e lett.cr.s ti"ere prElsented in 
toto. In order to acr.omcdat.e as nu:.n.y letters as possible, the editor restricted 
the letters to a bl"ief listing of arguments for or ageinst th9 proposal. One 
such letter wa~ l·andomly selected for the study in wi:"iich you are presently 
rm·ti.c:i.pati.ng • 
' 
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The purpose of this study is to determine whether there are wa ys 
of differentiating good voters from bad voters in state a1d Federal 
elections. This particular study grew out of a recent controversy in 
Congress concerning possibJe differences in the manner of thilikfog be-
tween 18 to 20 year olds, and those 21 and over. This research, spon-
sored by the joint congressional committee on voter regulations and 
by several state legislatures , is being undertaken in selected collages 
and universities throughout the country to study the probJe m, and to 
make recommondaticns concerning tho establishment of meaningful criteria 
to evaluate the quality of voter judgement aid behavior, to he used in 
the 1972 Presidential election. Specifically, this study is concerned 
·with two qµestions: Are there meaningful differrnces in ability to 
weigh information between those individuals 18 to 20 years old and those 
21 and over? Can college stud~nts critically evaluate material relevant 
to politica.1 iss1.1Gs·, ai1d make sound :u:td :i.ut.el] :igfmt .inrlgt>tni:>uts r.nw~P.t'U·· 
ing what they have read. 
DIRECTIONS 
On the next page you will find a blank sheet of paper. Detach this 
sheet and place it on the side of your desk. On the following page, 
you will find a list of arguments included in the letter by one of the 
town's residents. Please read each stntemcnt carefully, and immediately 
after reading each statement, write a responee to that statement on the 
blank sheet on the space provided. Include all your thoughts uid fe:..•linga 
on the statement. ilrite as much as you want, but express only one id.ca 
in each sentence you write. 
The following letter was written by one of the leading citizens of the 
ton:, c.. verJ respected and intelligent person who has performed a number 
of public scrvicns in .the town throughout his lifetillne. He has been an 
influencial member of the town 1s civic organizations, and the: general 
feeling in the tmm is thnt he is a trustworthy and honorable man. This 
prominent resident has spoken out on the major issues affecting the town's 
future on man;~r occasions in the past. He concluded his letter stating 
that ho mi.s definitely nen.inst the comp:m_y 111<.JV'ing into the tmm, due to 
t.J1•=- ~-•• ., o,u~A> m• ,11 I; i • .,,.,.1 ( aud J'.L'.i 111;,•<J ht--J ow ) • 
... 
\ 
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The purpose of this study is to standardize some of the materials in the 
study for use in later research. We are not particularly interested in your 
attitudes or opinions, but only to see if the materials can be used in later 
studies. 
DIRECTIONS 
On the following page, you will find a list -of argur.ients which were included -
by one of the town's residents. P1ease read the statements carefully. 
The following letter uas written by a middle aged t1an, one of the few 
people to move into the town recently (within the last six months, according 
to his letter). This mo.n le.ft !· ... is fo!'i:le!' residence in a."'lot'her state after he had 
run unsuccessfully for a small r~blic office. He stated that he had few 
supporters there, as others did not understand him and apparently did not place 
much trust and confidew::e in him~ Al though having made few friends in his present 
town as yet, he claims to understand the feelings of the town. He concluded his 
letter stating that he 1-ras definitely against the company moving into the town, 
. l due to the reasons mentioned. (and printed b~ow). 
! 
,. 
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A. 
B. 
c. 
D • 
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; 
1 
1. 
J. 
10) 
Pl.case write your responses to each statement in the space p~ovided. 
·) 
\ 
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A. The CO?llla?lY plans to build on la:;.1d set aside as a park and recront.i onl'l.1. 
iirea,, one of the nice:r placeo in town. There are no other-are~s in 
town suitable for a park. 
B. Crime is on the rise in the town. Who knows what will happen when the 
c.'.l;ripany moves in! - -- - · · 
c. '!'!:ere will be much morP. noise in the +,o;m with an the hustle and bustle 
of truck traffic,, pcol'le rus:ii:;g about, and ciJ.l the+.. 
D. The style of life in this to;:rn ,.~i.11 be altered r<?d:.ccl.ly. 
E. 'l'hare' s even a che.nce so:n,3 o.f the 11atural resources of the town ( onr -
water supply, pler..t and wildlife, ai.r) will be jeopardi~ed. I think 
the tow.i council is r..ot t:':lli1~3 u:.: all they know! 
F. This cor.ipa!ly has hinted t:i~t it will build more and r:tore throuzh the 
years--1::2.ybe e-.ren other corr,_;:-anies will enter once t!1e precedont is set. 
This will ju.st COf.!.PO~"ld the problems! 
G. You never know what tho~~ ecientists are doing in that research center 
thoy pla:.1 to b·.:ild., ei·;;.r.~r! 
H. The to~mts whole life will revolve around th.;i work shifts :!.n the .factory. 
I. Suppose they want to hire people from the outside! . 
J. '!'he :factory will be huge--i t just-won 1 t £it into- ou: to~riir-::--
.· 
.. 
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On this page, we would like you to indicate your personal feelings about 
the truth of the statements lis~ed below by circling the on~ number th~t best 
indicates your judgment of the truth of that statement. Notice that the la~ger 
the number the more true the statement is judged; the smaller the number the 
JDOre false it is judged. ·. . 
Please respond to each of the statements on this page by indicating ~our 
~Ee!'~~ opini<l!! of the statement's truth. Answer the CJ.Uestions in the 
order presented, and do not skip any question. Work rapidly, but read the 
statements carefully. 
1. I fully encourage the town coun~il to grant the company its request to move 
<.... into the town. 
: I 
·I 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12 I 13 I 14 I 15 I 
'" Ti:>efini tely / Protatly 7~;.;tain I Probably I Defir;i tely / 
i I 
.l -::- ( 2. I -.. \ j ~-
1 
-l 
. 3. 
False False True True 
The problems the company will cause in the town are very great. 
1// 2 I 3 I h I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11I12 I 13 I 14 I 15 I 
Definitely Probably I Uncertain / Probably / Definitely / 
- .false False True True 
My feelings on this issue are very intense • 
4. I feel nzy- position on this issue is very important to me. 
· L L/ _2__/_J_ I 4 L2 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 1 o I 11 I 12 I 1 3 I !li._/ 1 5 I 
(Definitely?Pr0babfY7' Uncertain I Probably / · Defln:LteIY7 
False False True True 
I 
' 
. · ... , -j 
l 
1 
. l 
l 
., 
i 
..... -
\ 
I 
~ 
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At this time, we would like you to look back to the responses which 
you wrote to the ar~uments written by one of the town's residents. We would 
like you to evaluati:i your own responses on the degree to which they are 
favorable or unfnvorable to tho town resident's position on the issue. Please 
score each sentence separately on the following basis: 
+2 very favorable to the resident's position. 
+1 somewhat favorable to the resident's position. 
0 completely neutral 
-1 som~1hat unfavorable to the resident's position. 
-2 v~ry unfavorable to the resident's position. _ 
Pl.ease put the rating number to the left of each sentence ~hat yo~ 
have written. 
.. 
... -, 
. _. 
,! 
1 
1 
·i . \, 
' 
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Pl.ease circle the appropriate number which best expresses your feelings. 
Answer the statements in the order presented • 
. What do you think of the company moving into the t01m? 
1 2 3 h 2 6 7 8 9 10 . 11 12 13 14 12· 
Very Very 
Unfavorable Favorable 
Rate your degree of involvement in this issu13. 
1 2 3 h 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1h 15 
Not at all involved Very nruch 
(Couldn't care less) involved 
If you were a resident of the town, how would you view the compatzy"1S 
request to enter the town? 
1 2 ~ h 2 6 1 a· 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 having all having both ha-,;ing all 
l. BAD points good and bad GOOD po_ints 
points 
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Pl.ease answer the following questions as.accurately as you can •. 
1. EconoI!lically speaking, the bulk of the town's residents could be categorized 
as • (poor, middle class, or rich) 
2. How many individuals were residents of the town in 1960? In 1970? 
3. By what method will the issue finally be resolved? 
4, Characterize l!S best you can the resident who wrote the lettar that you read 
by checking the ar-propriate number on each line. 
a, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely neut.ral ext~e:r.idy 
untrustwor t;hy trustworthy 
b. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely neutral oxt!'emely 
ignorant intelligent 
c. 1 2 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extrem!'!ly neutral extrgmeIY 
inco~etent co;rpetent 
d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
; 
not at all neutral ve~y active ,. j active in in town 
·town 
e. 1 2 2 4 5 6 7 8 . 9 
extremely neutral not at all 
threatening threatening 
J t. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 .. 
l out to neutral not out to 
I perouade persuade 
J g. 1 2 ; h 5 6 7 8 9 
·l '. did not want neutral did w~;:t 
company to compar.iy to 
J11ove in JnOve in 
s. Briefly, what was the stated purpose of this experiment? 
l 
J 
l . ·-----.. ·------·-
·.' 
\ 
109 
On this page, please list as many of the arguments written by the t01zn•s 
resident as you can. (Please number each separate argument.} 
,· 
·- . .._. 
: 
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• 
Since it is essential that the students participating in this ezj,eriment 
have no knowledge beforehand of the materials contained in this booklet arid 
of the nature of this exoeriment, I PP.IJHISE NOT TO DISCUSS AlJY ASPECT OF THIS 
EXPERIME''NT WITH OTHER COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FOR THE DURATION OF THIS 
EXPERII-IENT (UNTIL MAY, 1971) 
Signed: __ ~--~-~~~~~--~~~-~~~-
Do you have any comments about the experiment or the experimenter? 
Do you feel that you were ndstreated in any way? 
Have you heard of this experiment previously which :may have affected your responses? 
If so, please explain. 
In the past, we have found that the results of such studies are affected by how 
hard the studant tried during the experiment. Some studan~s get very involved in 
the study 1 others do not. Without any penalty of any sort (you will still receive 
your experimental cre:iit), could you help us by indicati;·:6 yot1r involvement or 
interest in this particular e::.periment. In other words, please give us an 
indication of 11 how hard you tried. 11 
1 2 3 h 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
tried not 
at all 
12 13 14 15 
t:•ied very 
hard 
(The experimenter will eJ..'Plain the exact nat~re of the experiment when everyone 
is finished.) 
AGE: _____ _ 
/It 
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